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This paper assesses the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, determining 
whether it is pursuing an agenda to fully integrate into the international political order, 
or whether its policy comprises of a tactical quest for super-power status; it concludes 
by making a tentative prediction as to the trajectory of China's foreign policy in the 
coming decades. Optimists maintain that China's formation of complex economic and 
political ties with regional and international countries will bring both prosperity and 
security in the region, claiming that China's foreign affairs will focus on the 
maintenance and protection of these relations, upholding the political status quo. 
Pessimists, conversely, assert that Beijing's policy of integration is part of a wider 
strategy designed to build national power to a system-contending level. 
To establish the nature of China's foreign policy, this paper looks at two opposing 
theories of intemational relations which describe both interpretations: Complex 
Interdependence (supporting the optimists' interpretation) and Realism (supporting 
the pessimists' interpretation). In Part One, it reviews the key theorists of the 
twentieth century; it concludes that the Realist plinciples of Robert Gilpin, and the 
Complex Interdependence principles of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, represent 
the most reliable tenets of each theory. Thus the theoretical framework of the paper 
rests on the principles of these two interpretations of the Realist and Complex 
Interdependence theories. 
In Part Two of the paper, four indicators of China's foreign policy are assessed: 
1. China in the World Economy 
2. China's International and Regional Relations 
3. China's National Defence 
4. China's Domestic Policy and Internal Characteristics 
Each indicator is then analysed by applying the theories of Complex Interdependence 
and Realism to the data. 
The paper concludes by amalgamating the analyses of each indicator, making an 











best describes China's foreign policy. It determines that the Realist theory is the most 
descriptive paradigm of China's foreign policy, and can systematically undermine the 
central assumptions of Complex Interdependence theory. Thus it concludes that China 
is following a tactical strategy aimed at assuming super-power status, and that in the 
corning decades will calculate the costslbenefits of gradually changing the 
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"When China aM'akes, it will shake the world. " 
(Napoleon Bonaparte) 
Since the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) , in 1949, China has 
evolved from an isolated, underdeveloped country, into a major player in the international 
political arena. After the demise of the Republic's founder, Mao Zedong, in 1976, the 
instatement of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 heralded a new era, profoundly shaping the 
country's foreign political agenda as it sought to integrate into the global system. In 
parallel to China's rise to fortune, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
consolidated its monopoly of power through the smooth transition of power to Jiang 
Zemin in 1989, and more recently to the 'fourth generation' with the instatement of Hu 
Jintao.2 During this period, China has undergone significant structural reformation to 
facilitate its assimilation into the global economy, and ensure the continued and rapid 
growth of its national power. This has led statesmen and academics alike to make varying 
assessments of China's foreign policy under the CCP, and the political goals it attempts 
to achieve. 
The optimists regard China's foreign policy as a movement towards global integration 
into the existing political order. They claim that the formation of complex economic and 
political ties, with regional and international countries, will not only ensure China's full 
integration, but will bring both prosperity and security in the region. Consequently, they 
claim that China's foreign affairs will focus on the maintenance and protection of these 
relations, upholding the political status quo. The pessimists, conversely, describe China's 
foreign policy under the CCP as a tactical strategy in its quest for super-power status. 
1 China's official name since 1949 is the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the course of the 
paper, I will mainly refer to the PRC simply as China, or may refer to events being driven by Beijing, the 
political capital of the PRe. Whilst these tenns will be used interchangeably. it should be noted that all 
tenns referto the People's Republic of China. 
1 The most recent transfer of power occurred on March 15th, 2003, when President Jiang Zemin peacefully 
stepped down to make way for the next generation of Communist leader, President Hu Jintao, who has 











They assert that Beijing's policy of integration is part of a wider strategy, a move on the 
political chessboard in the competition for political supremacy, and that China's political 
agenda consists of a subtle set of manoeuvres designed to build national power to a 
system-contending level. 
These two interpretations can be theoretically supported by two opposing paradigms of 
international relations: the first, known as Realist Theory, upholds the pessimists' 
conception that the global order is made up of competing states in a continual process of 
conflict and characterized by the continual cycle of rising and falling powers. Under this 
doctrine, it would be supposed that a growing China would necessarily implement 
policies attempting to elevate it to super-power status.3 The optimists refer to the theory 
of Complex Interdependence in order to support their claims that major costly conflicts 
are an anachronism, which are obsolete in an era of international regimes and complex 
economic ties. It asserts that advances in technology, transport and communication define 
the modem world; this has created fundamental changes in traditional agenda setting and 
foreign policy, creating an absence of hierarchy among political issues. Under the 
characteristics of this paradigm, China's foreign policy would inevitably promote 
regional and international 'integration', protecting economic ties and maintaining the 
status quo.4 
Making the correct assessment of China's foreign policy is critical to understanding the 
present political climate, and the nature of political change within the international 
system. Thus the object of this paper is to appraise China's foreign policy under the CCP 
since the opening of its economy in 1979, and to conclude with a tentative prediction of 
its possible trajectory in the twenty-first century.5 This will be achieved by using two 
3 The concept of 'super-power' can be defined as a state that has dominant control economically, 
politically, militarily and culturally over either regional or international powers. Whilst we presently exist 
under a sole super-power - the United States - it is possible to have a system in which two or more super-
powers compete. 
4 The term 'integration' is a fairly wide concept; it refers to a country's multiple ties with other countries on 
a variety of issues such as politics, economics, security, environment, technology, crime, aid, and so on. 
Transnational actors, which blur the borders of sovereign states, facilitate integration. 
5 The time frame of this paper is generally set at 1979 to the present day, and predicted forecasts projected 
out into the twenty-first century. However, it will be instructive at times to refer to events that occurred 











opposing theories of international relations, Realism and Complex Interdependence 
theories; the application of a theoretical framework to the question will both facilitate the 
assessment of China's present policies, whilst also providing a basis from which a 
predictive analysis may be construed. Both theories will be applied to four separate 
indicators, which will signify which paradigm is substantiated by these aspects of China's 
foreign policy. 
The first part of the paper will reVIew the literature of Realist and Complex 
Interdependency theory, focusing on the key theorists of the late twentieth century. As 
the theoretical literature is both extensive and variable, particularly in the case of 
Realism, it will be necessary to assess the inconsistencies and then assert which central 
tenets of the theories will be used in the consideration of China's foreign policy. 
The second paIt, divided into four chapters, will look at the aspects of China's foreign 
policy based on the following indicators: 
I. China in the World Economy 
2. China's International and Regional Relations 
3. China's National Defence 
4. China's Domestic Policy and Internal Characteristics 
These particular indicators represent the significant features of both theories, allowing for 
a thorough and balanced analysis. Each chapter will be concluded by a brief analytical 
summary, pinpointing aspects that are indicative of either theory; the aggregate of these 
summaries will then be presented in the final conclusion. The dominant characteristics of 
the indicators will consequently divulge which theory best describes the course of 
China's foreign policy. This, in turn, will allow us to make a cautious prediction of 











1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two paradigms of international relations will be used to determine the nature of China's 
foreign policy: 
1. Realist theory 
2. Complex Interdependence theory 
Whilst both theories represent 'ideal' models, their opposing stance creates a useful 
framework in which to analyse the question. Whilst 'grey areas' may be encountered in 
the analysis, the contradictory principles of the theories will necessarily facilitate a clear 
and firm conclusion. 
The literature on Realism is impossibly expansive, and some would argue dates back 
2,500 years. For this reason it will be necessary to give a brief historical background to 
Realist thought, before venturing into greater detail about the three major Realist theorists 
of the twentieth century. Each of the theorists have made fundamental amendments to the 
Realist school of thought, choosing to emphasise different principles in presenting their 
own theoretical framework. It will therefore be necessary to compare the varying 
principles of these theories, in order to discard the principles that can be undermined and 
to determine which central Realist tenets this thesis will be based upon. The literature on 
Complex Interdependence is somewhat more diminutive. Whilst it will be instructive to 
review briefly the origins of this theory, this section will be more clear-cut. Evolved out 
of liberal thought in the late 1970s, the central principles of Complex Interdependence 
have remained largely unchanged by liberal theorists and its central tenets have remained 
constant. 
Thus the purpose of Part One will be to introduce each of these theories. This will 
provide a review of the literature of the major theorists, offering an assessment of the key 














3.1 Historical background 
Realist thought can be traced back as far as the Classical historian Thucydides. In his 
interpretation of warfare in his "HistOfY of the Peloponnesian War, " he sawfear6 as the 
key motivating force in the Athenian/Spartan arms race that preceded the war. He 
observed, "The strong do as they will, and the weak suffer what they must.,,7 Thus, the 
idea of power as the optimum goal of international relations was born. A state that 
accumulated power is able to determine the fate of those who are consequently weaker. 
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) furthered Realist thought with his assertion that 
humans were inherently greedy with an insatiable lust for power, and capable of using 
any means to acquire it - it was the result that mattered. His belief in the shortcomings of 
human nature is clearly reflected in much of modem Realist thought. He was one of the 
first to emphasize the lise of force by the state to implement its policies in order to obtain 
its agenda. He commented, "There is simply no comparison between a man that is armed 
and one that is not. It is unreasonable to think that an armed man should obey one who is 
not or that an unarmed man should remain safe and secure when his servants are armed."g 
By this he asserts that security is every man's prerogative. Indeed he later states in his 
works, "For with contempt on one side, and distrust on the other, it is impossible that 
men should work well together.,,9 Here Machiavelli highlights the problem described by 
later theorists as the 'security dilemma': an actor may only feel safe ifhe is stronger than 
another actor, but by being stronger, may only incite the distrust and insecurity of other 
actors, and so the cycle continues. 
6 In the course of this historical overview, I have placed emphasis on the factors which make up the central 
traditional Realist doctrine. 
1 Williams (1994), p.8 
8 ibid., p.9 











Realist thought was furthered by the contributions made by the philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679). He represented his ideas on global order in his work, "The 
Leviathan", written in 1651. His pessimism towards human nature was iterated in his 
observation of the presiding anarchy of states acting within the global order. He 
contrasted the behaviour of individuals under a sovereign state and a universal law to the 
relations between states where there is no central ruling power. To describe international 
relations as being in a state of anarchy is not to presume that chaos prevails; rather, he 
explains that states are perpetually suspicious with an inherent sense of insecurity, which 
arises from the fact that there is no central presiding power structure. 
I have briefly outlined the historical background of Realist thought, though word 
constraint has only allowed me to touch on this long and deeply entrenched tradition. 
Whilst I have had to omit the work of some of the other great Realist thinkers, the above 
selection has provided an aggregate of Realist principles with which to assess modem 
theorists. In sum, they provide the basics of the theory that remain consistent throughout 
modem Realist thought. They assume that the state is the major actor in determining the 
global order; the anarchic nature of the system results in a prevailing sense of insecurity 
and fear between states, producing cyclic inter-state conflict; whilst fear is a motivating 
factor, so is man's inherent lust for power; thus states will use force in order to protect 
and maximise their own interests. Furthermore, as the length of the tradition attests, there 
is an overriding belief that history remains essentially unchanging. One modem theorist 
suggests, "Ultimately, international politics can still be characterized as it was by 
Thucydides." to 
3.2 Hans Morgenthau 
An American refugee from Nazi Germany, Morgenthau became one of the leading 
Realists of the 1950s and 1960s. He helped to establish the Realist paradigm in 
International Relations in the US, culminating in his book 'Politics among Nations." He 
starts from the premise that international politics is essentially a struggle for power, and 











that states determine their own interests in terms of power. He has been described by 
some contemporary academics as a 'Biological Realist', indicating his emphasis on 
human nature as the basis of his analysis. He asserts that 'human nature' has remained 
fundamentally unchanged, involving a lust for power and the use of rational choice by 
statesmen. He also puts forward the central importance of the balance of power among 
states. I I Morgenthau created what he termed 'The Six Principles of Realism", which 
outline his interpretation of the theory: 
The first principle states, "Political Realism believes that politics, like society in general, 
is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature." 12 He later adds, 
"Human nature, in which politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical 
philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws."l3 It is 
therefore possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective laws, as human 
nature is unchanging. 
The second principle states, "The main signpost that helps political Realism to find its 
way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in 
terms of power:.I4 He claims that statesmen will thus think and act in terms of interest 
defined as power. This provides a rational order with which to approach the subject 
matter of politics, making the theoretical understanding of politics possible. He later 
suggests that this principle will guard against misleading notions such as the concern with 
motives and the concern with ideological preferences. 15 And so Realism stresses the 
rational, objective and unemotional. 
The third principle states, "Realism does not endow its key concept of interest defined as 
power with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.,,16 Morgenthau defines 'power' as 
II Williams (1994), p,lO 
12 Morgenthau (1968), pA 
I.1 ibid., P.33 
14 ibid .• p. 5 
15 ibid. p.36 











"anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.,,17 Thus power 
and interest can vary in content and meaning, which may be determined by the political 
and cultural environment. He assumes that interest defined as power is an objective term 
which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is eternally fixed. 
Morgenthau's fourth principle states, "Political Realism is aware of the moral 
significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the 
moral command and the requirements of successful political action.,,18 He asserts that 
universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states, as moral issues may 
be overridden by political concerns. A state must put the safety of its citizens above 
upholding universal moral principles 
His fifth principle asserts, "Political Realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a 
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.,,19 Though he concedes 
that nations are often keen to imply that their policies are such. We are, therefore, unable 
to analyse a state's action by tuming to moral laws, and must instead use the concept of 
interests defined by power. It is this concept that can save us from 'political folly' as we 
are able to judge the actions of states as we judge our own, and can pursue policies that 
respect the interests of other nations while pursuing the interests of our own?O 
Morgenthaus's sixth and final principle states, "The difference, then, between political 
realism and other schools of thought is real and profound ... .Intellectually, the political 
Realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere.,,21 Whilst he recognizes that other 
facets of human nature exist, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political 
behaviour, "political man" must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature. 
Morgenthau's Principles of Realism create a theoretical framework that is heavily rooted 
in human nature. He creates an abstraction of 'political human nature', which is 
17 Morgenthau. (1968), p.l 0 
18 ibid. p.8 
19 ibid. p.9 
20 ibid. p.ll 











rationalized by the concept of interests defined in terms of power that precede universal 
moral law in determining the policies of statesmen. However, by rooting his theory in 
human nature, Morgenthau has come under heavy criticism.22 Whilst he attempted to 
create a theoretical framework of rationality and objectivity, his core concept seems far 
too elusive. Human nature just cannot be quantified, and his concepts of power and 
interest are also dealt with in vague terms. This concept is cettainly useful, but its 
formless definition again undermines the solidity of Morgenthaus's theory. Further, his 
principles seem to provide a set of concepts that may help to describe foreign policy, but 
do little to help predict its direction. Although Morgenthau's interpretation of Realism 
suffers from spongy assertions, his concept of states' policies being defined by their 
motivation for power remains a useful concept, but not one on which to base our entire 
assumptions. 
3.3 Kenneth N. Waltz 
Amongst Morgenthau' s stringent critics was Kenneth Waltz, who in response created a 
new paradigm in an attempt to reformulate Morgenthau's principles of Realism. In his 
ground breaking 1979 book, "Theories of International Politics", Waltz made a 
deliberate departure from 'Classical Realism'. He subsequently focused less on the 
elusive concept of human nature and man's lust for power. Instead, Waltz based his 
tenets of Realism on the Hobbesian concept of 'anarchy'. In a move away from 
Morgenthau's principles, Waltz assumes that states are primarily searching for security as 
opposed to coveting power. Thus, he puts forward the notion that the anarchical nature of 
the international system is one of the fundamental determinants of international political 
behaviour. Further, he places unprecedented emphasis on the structure of the system In 
terms of anarchy and the distribution of power and capabilities among states. He argues 
that these determine the order of the international hierarchy, the balance of power, and 
that this structure has a direct bearing on the stability of a system. Waltz's change of 
emphasis on the Classical Realist tenets, and his introduction of structural factors in 











assessing international political behaviour, have led contemporary academics to describe 
him as a 'Neorealist' or a 'Structural Realist.' 
Like Morgenthau, Waltz rests his assumptions on the fact that international politics have 
remained consistent throughout history and that there is "the striking sameness in the 
quality of international life through the millennia.,,23 Again, this allows us to assume that 
the principles of Waltz's 'Neorealist' paradigm are universally applicable. He claims that 
the continual and cyclical characteristic of international political behaviour, despite the 
internal variations of different states, exists because they arise from the persistent 
structure of international anarchy. Thus, international relations consists of anarchic 
political structures; order is not imposed by a higher authority, as it would be 
domestically within a sovereign state, but arises from the interaction of formally equal 
political actors?4 Hence, national and international political actions are distinct from one 
another because the former operates within a hierarchic system and the latter in an 
anarchic system. 
Waltz argues that each state is a separate and autonomous 'unit' that must ultimately 
count on its own resources to realise and protect its interests. "Each unit's incentive is to 
put itself in a position to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do 
SO.,,25 As a result of the anarchic nature of the system, Waltz asserts that the state of 
nature is the state of war/6 because all states at any time may use force on one another, 
and all states must be prepared to do so. Again, this distinguishes national from 
international affairs. It also reinforces Waltz's claim that states primarily seek security 
over any inherent lust for power. 
As Morgenthau abstracted 'political man' from the complex components of human 
nature, so Waltz's principles "abstract from every attribute of states except their 
23 Waltz (1979), p.66 
24 ibid. pp.88-99 
25 ibid. p.107 











capabilities.,,27 Whilst this reveals Waltz's attempt to impose rationality and objectivity 
on his theory, its major purpose is to depart from creating a 'reductionist' theory. 
Reductionism studies causes at the national level by assessing the internal mechanisms 
and features of a state. Waltz argues that such theories are flawed in that they allow 
variables to proliferate wildly. His theory, however, sees causes operating at an 
international level, and so avoids the ambiguities that reductionist theories create. 
Describing his theory of Structural Realism in a journal article eleven years later, he 
states, "The questions are then answered by reference to the placement of the [state] units 
in the system and not by reference to the internal qualities of the units. Systems theories 
explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce 
outcomes that fall within expected ranges.,,28 
The principle differences between states, Waltz asserts, "are of capability, not function. 
States perform tasks, most of which are common to all of them; the ends they aspire to 
are similar. ,,29 Thus states are differentiated in terms of their capabilities in relation to one 
another. Waltz combines this notion with his concept of political structure. This allows 
for a rational definition of a political structure by assessing the 'distribution of 
capabilities' amongst states.30 So a structure can be defined by the arrangements of states, 
and not by their internal characteristics. 
If the international order is perpetually anarchic, and there is no significant differentiation 
of functions between states, it becomes possible to define international political structures 
from one another by the distribution of capabilities among them.3l The inequality of 
distribution among states shapes their behaviour: since states are uncertain about the 
future intentions of others, they will avoid situations in which the expected distribution of 
cooperation benefits others relatively more. Again, structural constraints explain why 
27 Waltz (l979), p.99 
28 Waltz, The Journal ofInterdisciplinary History, Vo1l8, NoA, Spring 1988, pp.39·52. Sourced from 
Wi lliams (1994), pAl. 
29 Waltz (1979), p.76 
30 ibid. p.n 











states' international policies bare similarities, regardless of variations of national 
characteristics. 
Waltz uses 'Balance of Power' theory to consolidate his claims because it conceives of 
states simply as power structures competing in an anarchic environment.32 Whilst 
Morgenthau viewed power as an end in itself, Waltz regards power as, "a possibly useful 
means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it.,,33 
'Balance of Power' exists when the international system is in a state of anarchy, and is 
characterized by states primarily trying to survive within the system. Thus power 
becomes a means and not an end, utilised to ensure the major goals of security and 
survival. The first concern of a state, therefore, is not necessarily to maximise power, but 
usually to maintain its position within the system. 
'Balance of Power' theory allows us to make assumptions about international political 
behaviour. For example, adherents to Waltz's theory of Realism would not expect a 
strong state to combine forces with another strong state they would expect each state to 
'balance' out each other's power. 34 Unlike a national, hierarchical system of politics in 
which we may see strong powers 'bandwagon', in an anarchic system, bandwagoning 
could result in becoming prey to that power later. Conversely, when imbalances of power 
do occur, they can incite the ambitions of some states to extend their control. Thus the 
central conclusion of 'Balance of Power' theory is that under an anarchic system, two 
powerful states will necessarily balance against each other's power - and consequently 
rivals. 
Waltz's 'Neorealist' theory is an important contribution to the Realist tradition, but is 
useful only in describing the international system and is not useful at predicting change in 
the global order. In its attempt to avoid reductionism it fails to take into account the 
internal attributes of the state; further, it overlooks other important features of the 
32 Waltz (1979), p.1l4-128 
33 ibid. p.39 











international structure, such as economic issues and trans-national actors. Its primary 
downfall lies in its overly simplistic approach. 
3.4 Robert Gilpin 
Robert Gilpin responded to Waltz principles of 'Structural Realism' in 1981, when he 
published his work in "War and Change in World Politics." Waltz defines a very narrow 
identity of international relations as international politics based mainly on balance of 
power theory, but Gilpin includes a variety of new factors in an amended Realist scheme. 
In some ways Gilpin is more traditional because his approach is not purely systemic like 
Waltz's. He depal1s from Structural Realism in three major ways: Firstly, Gilpin does not 
set international politics apart, but redefines politics as 'political economy'. Secondly, he 
does not derive conflict only from the systemic level. 35 Thus Gilpin moves away from 
balance of power theory. However, the third striking difference between the Realist 
models of Waltz and Gilpin is the motivation of action: Waltz assumes survival as an aim 
and the maximization of security as a means; Gilpin, on the other hand, asserts that the 
maximization of wealth is of equal importance. 
Gilpin's theory of Realisra falls under five points that reflect the cyclical nature of his 
model. It will be useful to pay particular attention to the first two principles, as these are 
the most relevant in assessing our question: 
1. Stability and Change - "An international system is stable (i.e. in a state of 
equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system. A 
state will attempt to change the system if the expected benefits exceed the expected 
costs."36 
Gilpin argues that the concept of 'stability' is transient, and that over time the interests of 
individual actors and the balance of power among them change due to developments in 
technology, economics and so on. As a result, those actors who stand to gain most from a 
35 Guzzini (1999), p.3 











change in the system, and who have gained the power to effect such a change, will seek 
to alter the system.37 Thus states make calculations on the expected costs and benefits of 
such a change when formulating their foreign policy, as every state desires to increase its 
control over those aspects in the international system that secure its interests.38 Yet, 
unless a state believes that it can profit from changing the system, the system will remain 
stable. 
Whilst Gilpin assumes the continuity of politics, like Morgenthau and Waltz, he also 
believes that global issues have changed due to innovations and other factors. The main 
changes that he refers to are in transportation, communication, technology (especially 
within the military), and economic factors. He concedes that this has led to a highly 
interdependent world economy.39 This, in tum, has led to the amalgamation of the desire 
for economic gain and the struggle for power. FUlther, "Whereas other ages were 
dominated by religious and political passions, today economic interests and calculations 
have an enhanced role in the determination of foreign policy:,4o To consolidate his 
principle of the elevation of economics to 'high politics', Gilpin points to the Mercantilist 
doctrine, with its emphasis on trade finance and power as sources of state power.41 He 
refutes Waltz's claim that conflicts occur due to suspicion and miscalculations, believing 
that the opposite is true: states usually seek to change the status quo because they have 
calculated that they are most likely to gain from it.42 
Gilpin also refutes Waltz's premise that international political behaviour can be 
determined solely from the structure of the system, claiming, "Both the structure of the 
international system and the domestic conditions of societies are primary determinants of 
-------------
37 Gilpin (1981). p.9 
38 ibid. p.50 
39 ibid. p. 59 
40 ibid., p. 68 
41 ibid. p.69. Gilpin explores Mercantilism at greater length in his article "Three models for the future", 
Gilpin (1987). He argues, "the emergent world order will be characterized by intense international 
economic competition for markets, investment outlets and sources of raw materials" (p.293). Consequently, 
governments will necessarily manipulate economic systems in order to maximize their own interests, 
whether or not this is at the expense of other states. Mercantilist theory is at the heart of Gilpin's Realist 
paradigm. 











foreign policy.,,43 Thus, his principle of change demands that we must assess domestic 
sources of change, as the character of a society will affect its nation's response to 
possible opportunities in changing the global order.44 Whilst it is impossible to formulate 
a conclusive theory linking domestic factors to foreign policy decisions due to its infinite 
variables (as Waltz asserted), the most important indicator is the relationship between 
private gain and public gain - how does the growth in power of a state benefit individuals 
and groups within the state?45 Are members of a society given the incentive to push the 
government towards expansion and change? In order to answer these questions, Gilpin 
declares that we must "look at the environment, international and domestic factors that 
influence a state either to support the status quo, or to attempt to change the international 
system.,,46 Thus, a state will seek to support or change the existing international system 
by calculating the costlbenefits of such policies; the enviromnent, and international and 
domestic issues will influence these calculations. 
2. Growth and Expansion - "A state will seek to change the international system 
through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of 
further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits." 47 
The growth and expansion of a state necessarily translates into an increase in the power 
of the state. Gilpin argues that as a state grows more powerful, it will seek to extend its 
territorial control, its influence in the international political arena, and its influence in the 
international economy.48 A growing state will continue to pursue policies of expansion 
and international change until that state calculates that the cost of further expansion is 
equal to or exceeds the benefits of such policies. 
In the pre-modem world, Gilpin argues that growth and expansion was synonymous with 
territorial expansion. This was because agriculture was the predominant basis for wealth; 
43 Gilpin (1981), p. 87 
44 ibid., p.96 
45 ibid. p. 97 
46 ibid., p.l05 
41 ibid. p.106 











the acquisition of territory was crucial in a state's quest to accumulate power and 
wealth.49 This is no longer the case, in a modem world where innovations such as 
technology can amass vast amounts of wealth and power against other states. Hence, he 
argues that we must not assume that modem states will seek to expand in purely 
territorial terms, but that political and economic factors must also be taken into 
consideration. 
Another distinction that Gilpin makes between the pre-modem and contemporary world 
is the relationship between power and money: in pre-modem times they did not 
necessarily coincide, but are now inextricably linked. 50 He argues that, "A fundamental 
and novel feature of the modem state is its role in the economy.,,51 Consequently, 
political power is always equated with economic issues. This has resulted in the greatly 
enhanced role of economic growth in the international distribution of power and wealth. 
The emergence of the world market economy has motivated states to participate in the 
world economy in the attempt to accumulate wealth and increase their power "money 
itself has become a form ofpower.,,52 
Gilpin argues that the relationship between the accumulation of wealth and power can be 
attested by the fact that superior economic competitiveness is often accompanied by 
superior military power. 53 This has resulted in a dramatic change in the nature of states' 
foreign policy. Most states appear to be concentrating their affairs on domestic 
consolidation and economic expansion in the world markets, which now have at least an 
equal footing with policies of territorial expansion.54 
In sum, when a state pursues a policy to change the international system, expansion is 
multi-dimensional. Unlike the traditional policies of territorial expansion, modem states 
seek also to expand by extending their political influence over other states, and especially 
49 Gilpin (1981), p. 112 
50 ibid. p. 124 
51 ibid. p.122 
52 ibid. p.130 
53 ibid. p.139 











by accumulating wealth and pursuing control or domination of the international economy. 
A state will continue to expand in these ways until the cost of expansion outweighs the 
returns. 
3. Equilibrium and Decline "Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits 
of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency for the economic costs 
and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the 
economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic 
capacity to support the status quO."S5 
As the power of a state increases it continually seeks to grow and expand. In order to 
achieve this, a state has to incur certain costs. A state will only continue to expand whilst 
the benefits of expansion outweigh the costs. As a state maintains an expansive 
trajectory, the cost of this process will necessarily rise and the returns will diminish. A 
state of equilibrium will eventually occur when the costs and the returns equal one 
another. Gilpin argues that this is only a temporary phenomenon and will subsequently be 
proceeded by decline. This will occur when the rising costs of expansion are met by 
greatly diminished returns and contraction. Consequently, a state will no longer find it 
profitable to maintain the stability of the system that they have created and dominated 
through growth and expansion. This, in tum, will create disequilibrium, providing a 
political environment that may allow other states to attempt to change the system. 
4. Hegemonic War and International Change - "If the disequilibrium in the 
international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new 
equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established." 56 
As Gilpin has asserted, equilibrium is a transitory state that eventually becomes disrupted 
by the rising costs of a state's expansionist policies and its diminishing returns. When the 
global order consequently falls into a state of disequilibrium, the status quo of the system 
55 Gilpin (1981), p.156 











becomes threatened. As the hegemonic power declines, it will necessarily decline in both 
wealth and power (which in tum can be translated as the diminished power of the 
military). Disequilibrium and the decline of a hegemonic state will subsequently provide 
the environment and opportunity for another state to make gains. A contending state will 
calculate if the benefits of attempting to change the system to its own advantage will 
outweigh the costs. This in tum will lead to the growth and expansion of the contending 
state and will predictably result in a change in the international system. 
5. Change and Continuity - "Although the purpose of this study has been to 
understand international political change, it also has assumed that an underlying 
continuity characterizes world politics .... One must expect that if somehow 
Thucydides were placed in our midst, he would ... have little trouble in 
understanding the power struggle of our age." 57 
Whilst Gilpin stresses throughout his work the changes that have occurred in 
contemporary international relations, he also asserts that the processes remain the same. 
His model is heavily based on Mercantilist theories and the elevation of economic factors 
to 'high politics' alongside military issues in the traditional Realist framework. Yet whilst 
the determining features of the international system have shifted, the basic principles of 
international political behaviour have not. Table 1. below presents a clear diagram 
depicting the cyclic rise and fall of powers within the political system. Gilpin maintains 
his stance as a staunch Realist, arguing that, "World politics is still characterized by the 
struggle of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global 
anarchy ... The fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world 
is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power 
among states, just as it was in the past.,,58 
57 Gilpin (1981). p.2ll 
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Gilpin provides the optimum theory with which to assess the foreign policy of China .. 
Whilst it maintains the central Realist tenets that states are the principle actors competing 
in an anarchic sphere, pursuing their interests and ensuring their own security, Gilpin 
acknowledges the high position of economics on the political agenda. Further, it allows 
us to look at the internal factors of a country to detennine what those national interests 
might be. 
Gilpin's theory of Realism successfully amends the shortcomings of Waltz's Structuralist 
paradigm and avoids the vagaries of Morgenthau's principles. Gilpin recognizes the 
changes that have occurred in state interests and policy goals, parallel to the evolution of 
the market economy; in response, he maintains the central Realist tenets, but incorporates 
economic factors into his model. He believes that in assessing power, politics cannot be 
viewed as distinct from economics. Gilpin also moves away from Waltz's central 
assertion of an anarchic system. He claims instead that the international system is one of 
hegemonic governance, which defines the characteristics of its particular order. 60 Hence, 
59 Source: Gilpin (1981), p.12 











it becomes necessary to assess the domestic attributes of states. Gilpin clearly moves 
away from Waltz's principles, whilst providing a model that adheres closer to traditional 
Realism. It provides a more useful set of principles in assessing and predicting foreign 
policy in a progressive and changing global system, and represents a more 
comprehensive theoretical approach. And so Gilpin's model of Realism will be utilized 











4. COMPLEX INTERDENDENCE THEORY 
4.1 Historical Background 
The theory of Complex Interdependence is based on a long tradition of Liberal thought, 
which can be defined as the belief in the potential for humankind to progress in working 
cooperatively with one another to achieve world peace. It believes in the importance of 
global and interdependent trans-state identity through which there can be a national 
pursuit of common interests, such as collective security. It argues that conflicts arise, not 
from the shortcomings of human nature, but from misunderstandings that cultivate 
suspicion and fear. It points towards the progression of globalisation and the increase in 
cosmopolitanism as determining the future role of inter-state relations. 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1648) first introduced the concept ofa community of nations based 
on sovereignty. He established the belief that there was an international law of both war 
and peace, which constituted a form of presiding global governance. 61 
Emmanuel Kant contributed the notion of the perfectibility of society. He argued that war 
was not the product of man being inherently evil or having lust for power, but was a 
result of miscommunication and imperfect institutions in society. Rousseau extended this 
theory, asserting that discussion can lead to less aggression - that people are rational 
b · 62 emgs. 
Idealist thought grew in popularity after World War One, and became a common political 
approach to international relations. This resulted in the formation of the League of 
Nations, resting on Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'. He believed that by creating 
mutual dependence between states to form collective security, conflict could be avoided. 
Sadly, such liberalist notions were literally blown apart with the advent of the Second 
World War.63 Realist theory became the dominant paradigm, until it was met with the 













substantial challenge of Complex Interdependence theory, developed by Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye. 
4.2 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
Keohane and Nye harshly criticize Realist thought in their book, 'Power and 
Interdependence' (1981). They assert that the Realist model is no longer capable of 
making the correct assessment of contemporary international behaviour, arguing that our 
era is marked by both continuity and change.64 In response to these perceived global 
political changes, they have developed a new theory, evolved out of Liberalist thought, 
which they call Complex Interdependence theory. They believe that: "Each of the Realist 
assumptions can be challenged. If we challenge them all simultaneously, we can imagine 
a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a 
clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of 
policy.,,65 Thus they present principles that offer an alternative interpretation of 
international relations, in direct opposition to Realist assumptions. 
Henry Kissinger proclaimed in a political speech, "the traditional agenda of international 
affairs the balance among powers, the security of nations no longer defines our perils 
or our possibilities .... Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are 
crumbling, old slogans are uninstructive, old solutions are unavailing. The world has 
become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.,,66 
Keohane and Nye attempt to consolidate these claims in their theoretical framework, 
arguing that balance of power theory and theory of national security are inept at analysing 
the elevated issues of economic and ecological factors. 
'Interdependence' most simply defined means 'mutual dependence' .67 Interdependence 
between states, or individuals within states, is characterized by the reciprocal flows of 
money, goods, people, and communications across international boundaries. These flows 
64 Art and Jervis (1992), p.171 
65 ibid. p.175 
66 Keohane and Nyc (1981), p.3 











and transactions must be costly if they are to be described as interdependent, otherwise 
there is simply interconnectedness.68 Whilst these flows are reciprocal, they are not 
necessarily symmetrical; in fact they are most likely to be asymmetrical: "It is the 
asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors 
in their dealing with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent 
relationship as a source of power when arguing over an issue.,,69 Thus Keohane and Nye 
assume that interdependent relations between states usually determine their political 
behaviour towards one another. Asymmetric interdependent relations between states can 
reflect the power of one state over another. 
Keohane and Nye identify three characteristics of Complex Interdependence: 
1. Multiple Channels - "[These] connect societies, including: formal ties between 
government elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties 
among nongovernmental elites and trans-national organizations. Interstate relations 
are the normal channels assumed by Realists. Trans-governmental applies when we 
relax the Realist assumption that states act as coherent units.,,7o 
They believe that mUltiple channels between states have evolved and increased rapidly 
during our era due to innovations in communication, transport, and technology. Modem 
international politics has become more complex than the traditional interaction between 
governments. Bureaucrats from different countries often deal directly with one another, 
separate from core governmental contact. Non-governmental elites also meet regularly, 
often at international conferences to discuss international political and economic issues. 
Further, close links have evolved between governments and businesses. This is 
particularly the case in government dealings with multi-national corporations, which can 
influence the policies of both national and host governments. As ties between states 
multiply and deepen, sensitivity to each other's policies increases; sensitivity can occur 
from both international and domestic policy setting. Indeed, they argue that foreign and 
68 Keohane and Nye (1981), p.9 
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domestic policies become further linked due to the characteristic of multiple channels, 
and that this increases the number of issues that can affect foreign policy. 71 
2. Absence of hierarchy among issues - "The agenda of interstate relationships 
consist of multiple issues that are not arranged in a consistent hierarchy .... military 
security does not consistently dominate the agenda [as it does in Realist thought]. 
Many issues arise from what used to be considered domestic policy and the 
distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes blurred:,72 
They assert that state relations characterized by multiple channels inevitably face a 
growing number of issues. Realist thought, according to Keohane and Nye, is unable to 
account for this growing number of issues, particularly problems relating to environment, 
resources, technology, population and communication and so on. Under conditions of 
Complex Interdependence, proliferated issues may assume any position in an 
international political agenda. Realists assume that security and military affairs will 
always supersede other issues in terms of importance. Whilst Gilpin amended this Realist 
assumption to include economic issues, Keohane and Nye also include issues relating to 
environment, ecology and domestic issues. They argue that these multiple issues do not 
have a set hierarchical place on the political agenda. They also depart from Realism by 
suggesting that domestic issues can influence foreign policies, and that in many areas 
over-lap. They do not differentiate between the 'high politics' of military affairs and the 
'low politics' of social issues. It would follow then that an international system that had 
an absence of hierarchy among issues would be less likely to see conflicts arising from 
the persistent domination of national security and military issues. 
3. Minor role of military force - "Military force is not used by governments 
towards other governments in the region, or on the issues, when Complex 
Interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these governments' 
relations with governments outside that region, or on other issues." 












Keohane and Nye's assumption of an absence of hierarchy among issues dictates a 
reduction in the role of the military. Realists point to the security dilemma suffered by 
states operating in an anarchic system, maintaining that military force is the dominant 
source of power. Keohane and Nye argue that countries displaying characteristics of 
Complex Interdependence do not suffer the same security anxiety. They believe that the 
fear of attack has declined in contemporary international relations, and that the fear of an 
industrialized country being attacked by another industrialized country is virtually non-
existent, for example western European countries.73 Whilst such interdependent 
relationships between these countries can influence the foreign and domestic policies of 
one another, force is not expected to be used coercively in decision making. 
Further, the effects of using military force have become increasingly costly in terms of 
life. financial expenditure, and its impingement on domestic affairs. The cost of military 
use between two countries who share interdependent relations stand to incur far greater 
costs; profitable transactions and money flows are likely to be disrupted or terminated 
and this could have a devastating effect on a country's economy. Thus, Keohane and Nye 
argue, military force assumes a minor role, and may only occur between countries that 
are not regional and do not share a relationship of Complex Interdependence. 
Keohane and Nye state that these three characteristics of Complex Interdependence will 
result in different international political behaviour, and alter the traditional political 
processes between countries. The first area that is altered is the nature of 'linkage 
strategies,.74 They argue that militarily and economically strong countries will attempt to 
dominate a range of governmental and non-elitist organizations by linking their own 
policies on some issues to the other states' policies on other issues. However, because 
goals can vary by issue area under Complex Interdependence, military strength does not 
necessarily result in dominance over issues, as there is an absence in the hierarchy of 
issues. "Thus as the utility of force declines, and as issues become more equal m 
importance, the distribution of power within each issue will become more equal in 
7~ Keohane and N ye (1981), p.27 











importance. If linkages become less effective on the whole, outcomes of political 
bargaining will increasingly vary by issue area.".75 Linkages made by powerful states will 
be harder to make as the effective use of force diminishes. 
Conditions of Complex Interdependence will also affect the political process of 'agenda 
setting', according to Keohane and Nye.76 Because of the absence of hierarchy among 
issues, the process of agenda setting will become increasingly important. Further, the 
amount of issues that may be on the international political agenda will proliferate and the 
agenda will take on a more complex nature with subtle nuances. They believe that under 
Complex Interdependence the agenda will be affected by the international and domestic 
problems created by subsequent economic growth, and from the growing sensitivity 
created by interdependent relationships.77 Thus agenda setting wiil be affected by 
changes in the emphasis of specific issue areas, the status of international regimes, rising 
sensitivity, and changes in the importance of trans-national actors.78 
The third political process that Keohane and Nye claim is affected by Complex 
Interdependence is the nature of trans-national and trans-governmental relations. They 
argue that, "the nearer a situation is to Complex Interdependence, the more we expect the 
outcomes of political bargaining to be affected by trans-national relations.,,79 They state 
that this has arisen from the development of 'multiple channels' between countries. 
Trans-governmental relations no longer determine policies or affect international affairs 
alone. Trans-national actors have assumed an increasingly important role in international 
relations. Multi-national corporations, for example, can act independently, or manipulate 
government strategies to their own advantage. Further, multiple channels have allowed 
trans-governmental actors to create coalitions in order to influence policy making on 
certain issues, undermining the Realist principle that states act as independent actors.80 
75 Keohane and Nye (1981), p.31 
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The final political process affected by Complex Interdependence, in Keohane and Nye's 
model, is the 'role of international organizations'. They believe that, "in a world of 
multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed trans-nationally and 
trans-governmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining 
is greatly increased."SI The rise of organizations such as the United Nations, ASEAN, 
and other trans-national organizations has been a distinctive feature of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. They help to change the traditional process of agenda setting by 
limiting the power of militarily strong states, and providing a platform for weaker 
countries. They also help to activate potential coalitions in world politics by bringing 
officials together. 82 Thus, they have become a growing int1uence on international 
political behaviour in agenda setting, coalition-formation, and by acting as platforms for 
political activities by weak states. 
Thus the characteristics of Complex Interdependence directly oppose and challenge the 
core principles of Realism, as demonstrated in Table 2 below. The state can no longer be 
seen as the sole actor in international politics; political, military and even economic 
issues do not necessarily dominate the international agenda; the regional threat of military 
insecurity has purportedly been greatly diminished; the new world is characterized by 
multiple complex ties that connect countries along a variety of channels. The world has 
changed, it claims, and with it arises the need for a new theoretical approach in assessing 
international political behaviour. 
81 Keohane and Nye (1981), p.35 











foal of Actors 
Realism 
Military security will 
be the dominant goal. 
I Complex Interdependence i 
. Goals of states will vary by issue area.1 
Transgovermental politics will make 
. goals difficult to define. Transnational I 




Military force will be Power resources specific to issue areas 
most effective, although will be most relevant. Manipulation of 
economic and other interdependence, international 
instruments will also be organizations, and transnational actors 
f--__________ +_u_s_ed_. _________ -+-i _w_'i_ll_b_e major instruments. 
Agenda Potential shifts in the Agenda will be affected by changes in the 
Fonnation Balance of Power and distribution of power resources within 
security threats will set issue areas; the status of international 
the agenda in high regimes; changes in the importance of 
politics and will . international actors; linkages from other 
strongly influence other • issues as a result of rising sensitivity I 
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Linkages of 
Issues 
Linkages will reduce Linkages by strong states will be harder to 
differences in outcomes make since force will be ineffective. 
among issue areas and Linkages by weak states through 
i reinforce international I international organizations will erode 
__ +. _h_ie_rarchL _______ \-i h_l_' e_ra_rc_h-«.y_, -------------------1 
Roles of Roles are minor, Organizations will set agendas, induce 
International limited by state power coalition-formation and act as arenas for 
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Table 2. Political processes under conditions of Realism and Complex Interdependence. 83 













5. CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOl\IY 
Both Gilpin and Keohane and Nye claim that the economy IS a major indicator in 
assessing international political behaviour. An analysis of the nature of the Chinese 
economic system, and the role it plays in the world economy is thus essential to our 
understanding of China's foreign poliey. This chapter will commence by reviewing the 
nature and growth of the Chinese economy under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
system and the changes that have occurred from Mao Zedong in the 1960s to the present 
day. We will then look at the major components of the economy, such as the role of 
foreign direct investment, state-owned enterprises, China's special economic zones, and 
the nature of Chinese business practices. The next part will assess China's economic 
relations with its neighbours and with the United States. Finally, we will consider China's 
afTiliation with international and regional economic organizations. 
5.1 The recent history of the Chinese economy: 
Emerging from the Second World War, China was an extremely underdeveloped nation, 
isolated from the rest of world as the leading powers entered the Cold War era. The 
Soviet Union initially forged a tenuous alliance with China, but this quickly ruptured 
whilst Mao embarked on his 'Cultural Revolution', and China suffered further exclusion 
from the global economic sphere. However, after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and 
the succession of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China experienced significant economic 
developments. Prior to 1978, China's trade was under strict political control, operating 
under a central planning regime. 
The significant economic changes were made possible by Deng's policy of 'opening up' 











move against Marxist ideology, the slogan of "to get rich is glorious" was banded around 
the country84. Deng introduced four market tools: 
1. Free Prices 
2. The profit motive 
3. Increased competition 
4. Openness to the outside world85 
The specific aim of these policies was to obtain large foreign exchange earnings, which 
would allow China to both modernize and become more economically and politically 
independent. FurthernlOre, it would allow for the transfer of information and technology 
from the West, and would help drag China out of its underdeveloped status. 
5.2 The nature of the Chinese economy 
Deng's economic refonns have led some to believe that China is moving towards a more 
liberalized and democratic system. Indeed many say that China is currently flourishing 
under the most democratic system they have experienced in the past five thousand years. 
How could communism and economic growth through essentially capitalist means be 
reconciled? In answer to this tricky ideological question Deng created a 'socialist market 
economy' that is distinctly Chinese in its features, particularly in the central role the 
government (now to a lesser extent) plays. The CCP have sought to avoid dependence on 
anyone power by encouraging broad competition. And yet China now depends on its 
neighbours for investment, and on the US primarily to absorb its exports. 
And yet the question Deng and his officials might reply with is, "how can their leadership 
survive without economic liberalization?" Their continued existence and stability rests on 
the opinion of the masses, and their quality of life. In a speech to the U.S. Congress in 
1995, Sutter stated that, "To buttress their survival politically, post-Mao leaders 
emphasise their concern with maintaining a 'peaceful international environment which 
assures continued trade, investment, and assistance flows so important to Chinese 
84 Burstein and De Keijzer (1998), p.17 











economic well-being.,,86 It seems no coincidence then that in 1980, Oeng drew up a 
three-point strategy: 
1. To double the size of GNP of 1980 (this was achieved by 1987) in order to solve 
the clothes and food shortage. 
2. To further double the GNP so that people can be 'fairly well off by the end of the 
twentieth century.' 
3. Over the next thirty to fifty years (i.e. by 2030), to establish a modem society 
where per capita GNP is the same as the middle class of developed countries.87 
It appears that Oeng's decision to open up China's economy and to reap the benefits of 
integrating into the world trading system was initially aimed at consolidating his Party's 
power base. 
5.3 Present growth rates 
The rate of China's growth has been well documented as the fastest economic 
development in history. According to World Bank: reports, China may well become the 
largest economy in the world by 2020, whilst Goldman Sachs makes a more conservative 
estimate of 2040.88 China has obtained its rapid growth from two engines: the 
development of foreign trade and the attraction of foreign direct investment (F01). Over 
the past 25 years, its real gross domestic product has expended at an average of 9% a 
year. Gro\V1h in foreign trade has averaged 15% annually since 1978; China' s trade 
deficit with America is now twice the size of Japan's. And every week, more than $1 
billion of foreign direct investment flows into the country. All this testifies to the global 
integration of China's economy, now the sixth largest in the world, with a GOP of $1.4 
trillion.89 One of China's greatest commercial achievements has been the development of 
a flourishing private sector; in 1978 it had barely 130,000 individual businesses, but this 
86 Sutter (1995), p.7 
87 Fumio Itoh (1997), p.180 
88 The Economist, "A survey of business in China", (20.03.2004). p.4 
89 There is a host of literature that lists China's growth rates, often with varying statistics. The ones 
presented here are taken from The Economist's' A survey of business in China" (20.04.04), which appears 











has now exploded into several million, representing a large part of the economy. In tum, 
this rapid growth has ensured the country's political stability. 
At the present moment, China still remains the preferred destination for the relocation of 
global manufacturing due to its relatively well-educated and cheap labour, earning it the 
label of 'workshop of the world'. It still remains a strong exporter of goods, which helps 
to fuel its rapid growth. The overall output of growth during 2003 was 9.1 % despite 
SARS and the Iraq war, and this grew to 9.7% during the first quarter of 2004. Further, 
employment rose by 8.6 million jobs.90 Min Zhao in his OECD report states, "The three 
underlying tendencies in the Chinese economy modernization, urbanization and 
globalisation - provide the context for the stronger policy emphasis on 'growth with 
equity' that became evident over the last year [2003]:,91 This recent economic data 
suggests that China is still experiencing rapid gro\\-'th through its integration with the 
world economy, whilst attempting to keep the economy from racing off the tracks by 
balancing gro\\-'th with equity. 
Whilst these unprecedented growth rates are often banded about with great optimism, the 
darker aspects of the Chinese economy must not be gilded over. The inherent stability of 
China rests on the continuation of high growth rates. It needs to create 12-15 million new 
jobs every year just to keep up with its popUlation explosion.92 It still experiences high 
levels of poverty, although it has succeeded in reducing poverty rates from 360 million in 
1990, to 151.9 million in 2003.93Yet it is experiencing a huge disparity in wealth between 
urban and rural areas, with income inequality reaching 0.47 on the Gini scale.94 Over 800 
million people living in the rural areas of China have been left out of the commercial 
explosion without benefiting from their countries growth; nearly a third of them are under 
or unemployed.95 Millions of these rural people are illegally migrating to urban centres 
qO These figures are taken from the latest OECD report complied by Min Zhao. 
91 Min Zhao, OECD Report (2004). p.l 
92 The Economist (20.03.2004), pJ 
93 Min Zhao, OECD Report (2004), p.3 
94 ibid. p.2 











where they have no job security and receive no government welfare.96 It seems no 
surprise then that the government is still so concerned with growth rates and employment 
statisti cs. 
5.4 The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
Growth statistics only go part of the way to describing the nature of an economic system; 
looking at its major internal components, and the aspects that drive it, will help create a 
more complete picture. One of the major engines of the Chinese economy is foreign 
direct investment (FOI). For the last two decades China has gradually liberalized its FOI 
policy, reducing restrictions and balTiers, and improving the investment environment. In 
its endeavour to attract foreign investment, China has created Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ), into which the government has poured investment, developing an efficient 
infrastructure for foreign companies to operate within. FOI has been playing an 
increasingly important role in China's economy in terms of capital formation, 
employment creation, labour training, technological transfer, productivity growth, 
competition, and integration into the world economy. 97 
China depends critically on foreign trade and investment for its economic development. 
In 1978, FOI levels were almost zero, but by 2000 had reached $360 billion. This has 
made China the largest FOI recipient in the developing world, and second only to the US 
globally.98 Its ability to attract foreign investment lies in its relatively well-educated and 
low-cost labour force, coupled with the magnetic draw of its potentially huge and fast 
growing markets. The Economist stated, "It seems every multinational in the world is 
either in China already or declaring that 'it can not afford not to be. ",99 The statement of 
Jack Welch, CEO of General Electric (GE), indicating that China would become the 
centre of the twenty-first century growth strategy for GE, further supports this. 100 With a 
population of 1.3 billion, China represents the largest consumer market in the world. At 
present, the prevailing poverty and low average income means that only a small 
96 ibid. 
97 Sutter (1995), p.5 
98 OEeD report (2002) 
99 The Economist (20.03.04), p.9 











percentage of the country the dramatically rising middle class - have spare income to 
spend on consumer goods. Yet international investors hope that the continued growth 
rates will produce the consumer market they are hoping for. 
Thus China's economy is both supported by and driven on the back of FDI. Attracting 
foreign investment has therefore become paramount to economic stability and survival. In 
response China has had to improve the investment climate through the liberalization of its 
traditionally protectionist policies and the creation of special economic zones, and the 
suppression of its inherent xenophobia. Its reliance on FDI has shaped the fonnation of 
economic policy; in order to increase the living standards of Chinese citizens and 
consolidate its power base, the government has had to relinquish some of its control in 
order to integrate into the world economy. The continued attraction ofFDI lies at the very 
heart of the Chinese economic agenda; this allows it to maintain its present growth 
trajectory and increase its economic power. 
5.6 State owned enterprises (SOEs) 
An inherent feature of China's socialist market economy is its state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). These have generally been labelled as fundamentally inefficient, impeding on the 
progress of the Chinese economic machine. It was only in March 1998 that reform of the 
ailing state sector was elevated on the economic agenda. The policy of 'zhuada 
fangxiao' - "grasp the big, and let go the small", was implemented. Through this policy, 
the more ineffective of the SOE were sold off or liquidated, whilst the more successful 
have been subsidised and nurtured. 101 The number of SOEs dropped from 262,000 in 
1997 to 174,000 in 2001 through this policy of restructuring, merging and closures. By 
2003, the top 500 reported revenues of $492 billion, with profits up 33% from the year 
before. 102 Accordingly, whilst their numbers have been dramatically reduced, their rise in 
efficiency has been equally dramatic. 












The relationship between SOEs and central government is of particular interest. Their 
original inception was born out of communist ideology, and their consequent reform has 
in some ways challenged this. About 120 million Chinese still rely on SOEs for their job 
security and welfare - for many, their continued existence is equated with the rights of 
the people 103 • But ensuing closures and mergers have left many unemployed: another 
motivating factor in the government agenda of fast job creation. According to an IMF 
working paper by Ray Brooks and Ran Tao published last November, whilst SOEs have 
been shedding workers, China's new private companies have created 17.5 million jobs in 
the last six years. I04 It appears that SOEs are more concerned with maintaining 
employment than generating profits, yet China's new private businesses are showing 
huge gro\\'1h rates. Thus as a result of China's bid to 'get rich quick', it has become 
imperative to phase out the more inefficient SOEs, absorbing that work force into the 
new private businesses. 
Consequently, it appears to some extent that China is following a policy to phase out the 
existence of its SOEs - the cornerstone of its communist market system - in favour of 
competitive and efficient private firms. But such an assumption could be misleading. It 
should not be overlooked that the government has had to tum on the taps of the state 
banks to help fund 'loans' to many SOEs; few of these are ever likely to be repaid. 105 In 
effect, the government is helping to subsidize them, and at the expense of the state banks' 
financial health. The Economist claims that the SOEs reform is not about profits or 
privatisation; that the aim of the government is not to reduce the state's control over key 
sectors of the economy, but to make that control more effective. Nor is the purpose of the 
SOEs to maximize wealth; they merely need to be efficient and big enough to have a 
strong international presence. "China's desire to become a super-power partly depends on 
its industrial policy. Having watched the break-neck expansion of foreign multinationals 
over the past decade, it wants to create its own global stars.,,106 
103 The Economist (20.03.04), p.16 
104 Sourced from The Economist (20.03.04). p.16 
105 Lu Huang (2004), p.9 











5.7 The nature of Chinese business practices 
The way in which business is conducted in China is also useful in creating a complete 
profile of China in the world economy. Although partly integrated into the global 
economic system, Chinese business conduct can vary enormously from that of the 
Western powers. Competition with local companies is often fierce, as foreign firms 
compete with subsidized companies who hold unfair advantages. The fact that China's 
developing capitalism is not solidly based on law, respect for property rights or free 
markets, and further undermines foreign competition. 107 Under the present bureaucratic 
system of government, China is subject to the 'rule of man' rather than the 'rule of law', 
with rights usually deriving from political power - often the power of an individuaL 
Consequently, the concept of 'guanxi' or 'connections' is all-important in conducting 
business. IDS Furthermore, the Chinese businessman greatly values the concept of 'face', 
formulating their business strategy either to gain it or to preserve it. Indeed, to deceive or 
attempt to wrong-foot a business opponent during negotiations is an accepted form of 
business behaviour. 109 In sum, Chinese business practices are highly nepotistic and 
deeply subversive, based on business laws awash with vagaries. 
5.8 Overseas Chinese and regional economic relations 
China's economic policy has been geared towards consolidating trading relations with 
neighbouring countries, whose investment and import quotas are essential to the 
continuance of its growth. It has particularly looked towards countries where overseas 
Chinese have an overwhelming influence on their countries' economies; Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are of particular importance. Cheong Inkyo states, 'The possibility of forming a 
North Asian bloc is now greater than before, with increasing discussions on economic 
integration in the region.,,11O During the brief economic shutdown between China and the 
West after the human rights abuses in Tiananmen Square in 1989, China was subject to 
economic sanctions. In response Beijing turned to rich, overseas Chinese from Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and other Asian countries for support, providing them with a lucrative 
!O7 The Economist (20.03.04), p.4 
108 ibid. p.ll 
109 ibid. p.12 











investment climate. III The importance of regional economic integration moved to the top 
of China's economic agenda. 
The tacit coalition of these economies has been termed the Greater Chinese Economic 
Area (GCEA), although the government has refrained from talking about it publicly. Kim 
Kwang-Yong states, "The GCEA can be divided into two specific areas. One, on a 
regional level, is to strengthen the economic ties between China, Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan, and on the other, on the global level, is to combine all Chinese economic 
powers."Il2The interesting aspect of these economic relations lies in the political realm. 
Relations between Taiwan have remained hostile for the last fifty years, strained by the 
issue of Taiwan's push for independence from the motherland. As will be discussed at 
length later, these cold political relations have come close to hot military action on more 
than one occasion. To a far lesser extent, the same can be said of relations between China 
and Hong Kong, with the latter fighting for greater democratic freedom. And yet these 
govemments work on the principle that political matters should be separated from 
economic matters. They have made a mutual effort to exclude political influence on 
economic activities in order to encourage mutual economic cooperation. 113 China does 
not allow political relations to impede on its economic partnerships within the regional 
bloc; its regional economic ties and consequently its integration are paramount to its 
economic stability, and hence its political survival. 
5.9 China-V.S. economic relations 
China's economic relations with the U.S. are crucial in making an assessment of its 
economic policy. When Deng imposed his economic reforms and opened China to the 
world, the Americans were first in. They poured huge amounts of investment into the 
fledgling market place in the hope for high returns. During this period, China and the US 
enjoyed warm relations, heated by the fact that they shared the Soviet Union as a hated 
foe. But with the advent of 1989, two events chilled relations dramatically. The first was 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, which heralded the end of the Cold War between the US and 
III Burstein and De Keijzer (1998), p. 48 
112 Kwang-Yong (2001), p. 95 











the Soviet Union. This removed the single most important impetus for cooperation and 
US interest in Chinese economic affairs. 114 The second event was the brutal Chinese 
persecution of pro-democratic student protests in Tianamen Square, which was met with 
utter horror by the US; the CCP's sheer disregard for human rights led to immediate 
economic sanctions being imposed on China. I 15 The economic standoff between the two 
nations lasted until 1992, during which China experienced a noticeable slump in growth 
rates,116 a clear indication that its economy had become dependent on its economic ties 
with the U.S. in order to maintain growth rates. 
The early nineties were characterized by a heavy US receSSIOn, which led to U.S. 
investors returning to the Chinese market where they could make higher returns than in 
their domestic market. 117 Relations in the parallel political sphere were not so amiable. 
The poiarity in economic and political ties with China provoked serious disagreements in 
Congress during Clinton's first administration. In May 1994, US statesmen proposed to 
deny China Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, which would effectively constrict 
trading relations between the two countries. This decision was based primarily on 
China's human rights abuses, but was also encouraged by accusations of Chinese arms 
sales to hostile nations and software piracy. 118 A battle ensued between conscientious 
statesmen and powerful multinationals, corporate bigwigs, and important commercial 
presidential supporters, who argued that MFN status must be granted. A decision was 
made to 'de-link' political and economic issues, and maintain good trading relations with 
China. This episode is indicative of the dependent nature of US economic ties with 
China; furthermore, it emphasizes the superlative position of economic issues between 
the two countries. 
During the second Clinton administration the US sought to improve relations with a 
presidential visit to Beijing in 1998. Deep suspicion had arisen in China after the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, which some Chinese statesmen suspected the US of provoking; 
114 K wang-Yong (2001), p.1 04 
115 Burstein and De Keijzer (1998) p. 48 
116 Cheong-Inkyo (2002), p.73 
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they were astonished that ten years of accumulated wealth could go overnight, and with it 
the mounting competition of the Asian Tiger economies. I 19 The Clinton administration's 
approach, therefore, was to bring China within the economic powers that agree to 'liberal 
norms': Gerard Segal described this approach as 'positive conditionality', allowing China 
access to trade benefits in return for 'system-maintaining behaviour' .120 This policy has 
resulted in partial liberalization of China's economy, coupled with even greater growth 
rates, and the continuation of a politically stable environment for unimpeded trade. And 
yet U.S. trade with China still remains fairly one-sided; in December 2003, the US was 
requested to open up its high-tech sector to China in return for trade concessions. 
Meanwhile, China was exercising blatant protectionism by then banning foreign chip-
makers from selling some wireless products without Chinese components. 121 The tension 
between the U.S. policy of liberalizing the Chinese economy and the continued areas of 
protectionism it faces has periodically strained economic relations. 
In the run up to its next election, the US remains uneasy about aspects of its economic 
relations with China. The fact that it currently has a $120 billion trade deficit with China 
will be a sensitive issue. 122 The government will also have to pacify U.S. labourers 
usurped by lost-cost Chinese workers with the increasing relocation of U.S. 
manufacturing firms to China. Furthermore, debate still rages between the two states over 
the fixed low rate of the Yuan, which is currently pegged to the dollar at about 8.28. And 
yet the US is stuck in a catch-22 situation; the allegedly undervalued Yuan is purportedly 
creating artificially low-cost exports and undercutting U.S. competition, but many of the 
exported goods coming out of China are manufactured by U.S. multinationals. 
An even greater area of anxiety has arisen from China's vast accumulation of foreign 
currency. The only circulated currency in China is the Reminbi (RMB), whose basic unit 
is the Yuan; all foreign currencies have to be converted to RMB when doing business in 
119 Zhu Wenli (2001), p.51 
120 Sourced from Roden (2003), p.l95 
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the country.123 The People's Bank of China, which operates under strict government 
control, is the sole buyer of foreign currency. The country's foreign exchange reserve is 
now estimated to stand at $356 billion although Chinese figures are pegged much lower 
owning 11.3% of the world total, and amassing American Treasury bonds. 124 Whilst 
this may help safeguard the economy against the vicious swings of the global economy, 
its potential has created an air of unease in Washington. Indeed, all of these facets of 
Sino-US economic relations contribute to a pervading sense of US unease with aspects of 
China's economic policy. 
5.10 China's affiliation with regional and international organizations 
China has developed from its initial economic policy of seeking unilateral relations to 
playing an increasing role in regional and international multi-lateral economic 
organizations. These have allowed Beijing to consolidate its own economic policies, 
whilst allowing it to promote its own ideas for international policies. During the 1990s, 
China sought to join key regional organizations. In 1991 it joined the Asia Pacific 
Economic Forum (APEC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993.125 These 
allowed China to strengthen its regional economic ties with its neighbours, many of 
whom are also experiencing rapid economic growth, though still recovering from the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. APEC is concerned primarily with trade and investment, 
endorsing the principles of free trade. The ARF is concemed with collective security, 
trust building between regional countries, and economic safety measures. 126 Although 
these institutions only operate under mutual cooperation and consensus, they have 
provided China with a regional platform to assert its economic opinions and to facilitate 
its multi-lateral relations. 
123 Huang (2004). p.2 
124 The Economist (30.08.2003), p.54 - An IMF report in September 2003 calculated China's foreign 
currency reserve to stand at $440 billion, but this estimate is far higher than the average. Beijing's lack of 
transparency has made the accurate calculation impossible. It appears that they are reluctant to disclose the 
full extent of their reserves, and instead give official rates far lower than those calculated by foreign 
economists. 
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During the Cold War era, in a movement against the Soviet Union, China was made a 
member of the United Nations Security Council. In the 1980s, it became a member of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during which time China began 
to adapt its economic policies in order to come in line with some of these organizations 
prerequisites. 127 It soon began to draw huge benefits, which encouraged China to 
undertake further liberalization goals. 
But China's primary goal was to become a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), now known as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Beijing first 
officially applied in 1986, but was immediately turned down due to the protectionist 
nature of its socialist market economy. In response, China began a policy of gradual 
liberalization: trade regulations were reformed; trends in the international environment 
were monitored in order to reform its domestic policy; the 1990s saw broad tariff 
reductions and the easing of non-tariff barriers; and China attempted to improve relations 
with other WTO members, especially the US and Japan. 128 The focus of Chinese 
economic policy consequently became focused on reformation to fit in with the liberal 
nonns of the existing economic order. 
It took nearly fifteen years of negotiation between Beijing and the WTO before China 
was granted membership to the organization on December 11 th , 2001. 129 The benefits to 
China have been immediate - the period following its accession has seen rapid increases 
in levels of FOr. By March 2004, it had risen by about 8%, with WTO liberalization 
allowing a rise of FDI in the services sector, which will have profound effects on the 
productiviry and grO\vth. 130 The anticipated benefits of membership are substantial, 
allowing China to expect strong growth figures and economic stability. It also provides 
Beijing with the opportunity to acquire power in determining international economic 
policy, and protect its own interests. But affiliation comes at a price; the CCP has had to 
relinquish some of its control over its economic sector, and allow the infiltration of 
127 Yahuda (1999), p.653 
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foreign commerce onto its shores. Kwang-Yong states, "The US controls international 
organisations such as the WTO and IMF to influence its control over other countries; at 
the moment China must concede to U.S. demands and adopt cooperative economic 
policies.',l31 But in March 2004, America filed its first complaint against China in the 
WTO. It accused China of discriminating against foreign software companies by giving 
tax concessicns to chips made in China. 132 WTO membership has allowed China to reap 
the ensuing economic benefits, but China is still dragging its protectionist feet against 
U.S. liberal stipulations. 
5.11 Analytical summary 
Since 1978, China has foHowed a distinct policy of opening up its markets to the global 
economy, and implementing a strategy of gradual liberalization. It has moved from its 
imposed isolation and Maoist ideological constraints to embrace the riches of the modem 
world. It displays characteristics of 'multiple channels' in its formation of complex 
economic ties, both regionally and internationally, and its participation in multi-lateral 
organizations. Domestic welfare has remained high on its political agenda, and has 
remained a primary motivator in pursuing its policy of economic growth. Indeed, 
economic issues have been seen to supersede political/military issues, particularly in its 
regional trading relations, as we would expect to see under conditions of Complex 
Interdependence. 
Furthermore, the government has gradually relinquished its control over the economic 
sector in conforming to the protocols of international organizations such as the WTO. In 
accordance, it has ensured a politically stable and peaceful environment to facilitate its 
economic affairs, and has fostered a relationship of mutual dependence with the US. 
These features of the Chinese economy appear to suggest an economic policy that 
presents distinct characteristics of Complex Interdependence. 
131 Kwang-Yong (2001), p.l05 











Yet one can argue that China's policy of economic reform is hinged on the CCP's need to 
both justify and consolidate its power. Indeed, its strategy has resulted in the 
accumulation of national power and stability as well as an increasingly powerful presence 
on the international stage. Its affiliation with multi-lateral organizations has provided 
China with a platform to influence regional and global economic policy in its favour. In 
order to increase its power base, and hence pursue its own interests, China has had to 
suppress its traditional xenophobia and allow foreign business to take root on its soil. 
Beijing has created an attractive environment for FDI by creating SEZs, undervaluing the 
Yuan to ensure cheap exports. Furthermore, China's membership to the WTO has had the 
desired effect of greatly increasing FOI flows. 
One could argue that far from there being an 'absence in hierarchy in issues', economic 
affairs continually dominate the agenda, as a Realist might expect. If China is pursuing a 
policy aimed at accumulating power through economic growth, then its only option is to 
play by the rules of the existing order. One could argue that it has no option but to 
integrate into the world economy and accept the liberal protocols demanded by Western 
powers. It has already been noted that Chinese businessmen readily employ deceptive 
measures to achieve what they desire; a Realist might expect a state to behave 
accordingly. They might also refer to the palpable tension that remains between China's 
policy of liberalization and its protectionist exploits. The reformation of the SOEs has 
increased the governments' control and presence on the corporate scene; state controlled 
banks still heavily subsidize many local industries; investment advantages are offered to 
overseas Chinese above other foreign firms; and the government is still implementing 
protectionist measures, even after its supposed acquiescence to the WTO protocol. 
One could argue that these features of the Chinese economy display strong Realist 
characteristics of a state-centred system pursuing its own interests. China's intent on 
accumulating economic power can be supported by the existence of its vast surplus of 
foreign currency exchange and US treasury bonds; this has a distinct Mercantilist flavour, 
like hoarding gold under the castle. Indeed, since China has opened its economy to the 
























6. CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS 
China's economic refonns have had a significant effect on the nature of the relationships 
that it is has forged with its regional neighbours and beyond. In order to ensure that 
access to Western markets remain open and regional economic ties remain strong, China 
has worked towards maintaining a peaceful international environment. Some academics 
have applauded China's 'system-maintaining' approach to its foreign policy, whilst 
others have asserted that this strategy is aimed at ensuring political survival, and 
nurturing an environment in which China can strengthen its national power. \33 Indeed, the 
careful analysis of China's international and regional relations is of primary importance 
in assessing the trajectory of its foreign policy. This chapter will commence by reviewing 
the CCP's official line on foreign policy objectives and the major issues that shape their 
strategy, before turning to China's attitude towards the existing global order. The 
following part will give a brief overview of its use of force in the second part of the 
twentieth century, and its contemporary approach to multilateral and bilateral relations. 
We will then tum to Sino-U.S. relations, and America's role in Northeast Asia, before 
focusing on China's regional bilateral relations. 
6.1 China's Official approach to Foreign Policy 
During the Cold War, China was used as a political pawn under the bipolar system, 
aligned primarily with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, before being harboured by the U. S. 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Since the end of the Cold War, China has experienced an era 
of unprecedented peace, free from any real threat of attack by more powerful countries. 
An official Chinese scholar, Xia Yishan, has described the neighbouring area as, "a 
region of peace, friendship and cooperation.,,]34 The strong international reaction to 
China's brutal crackdown at Tiananmen Square came as a surprising blow to Chinese 
leaders, who felt further undennined by the consequent collapse of communism in Russia 
and Eastern Europe. In response, they used foreign affairs to demonstrate the legitimacy 
I33 Among the pessimists are Sutter, and Yahuda. 











of their Party, forging bilateral and multilateral agreements to enhance their image.135 
Thus since the 1990s, China has publicly projected itself to be a peaceful, cooperative 
and responsible power. Yong Deng claims that this behaviour was also provoked by U.S. 
insistence that China would not be treated as a great power until it acted with 
responsibility.136 It is under these conditions that China has formulated the official 
direction of its foreign policy, which are listed in tables 1. and 2. 
Major Principles of Foreign Policy of the PRC 
1. Pursue the principle of independence. 
2. Oppose hegemonies and work to safeguard world peace. 
3. Promote the establishment of a new, fair, and reasonable intemational political and 
economic order. 
4. Respect the diversity of social systems and cultures. 
5. Establish and develop friendly relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. 
6. Promote common prosperity on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. 
7. Participate actively in multi-lateral 
Table 3. Major Principles of Foreign Policy 
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
2. Mutual non-aggression. 
3. Non-interference in other nations' intemal affairs. 
4. Equality and mutual benefit. 
5. Peaceful co-existence 
Table 4. The Five Principles of Peaceful 
135 Sutter (1995). p.7 
136 Yong Dend (2001), pp. 359-360 
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China currently promotes itself as a peaceful and cooperative nation. Indeed the role of 
the military in its present foreign policy appears relatively minorl39. Yet since the 
formation of the PRC, it has been engaged in numerous military battles. Two years after 
the succession of Mao, it inflicted decisive defeats on Western armies during the Korean 
War in 1950. A battle of ideologies ensued as China sided with communist North Korea 
against anti-communist UN forces in the south of the Korean Peninsular. 140 The 
consequences of the Korean War have shaped modem bilateral relationships; the US 
sided with Taiwan against China, and still remains a close ally; similarly China remains 
closely linked with troublesome North Korea; most importantly for China, its success 
ensured that it was subsequently treated as a great power. Michael Yahuda claims that, "It 
was the Chinese performance in Korea ... that earned the PRC the great power status for 
which Chinese had long yearned since being humiliated by Western powers more than 
one hundred years earlier.,,141 China clearly revelled in its new stature, soon acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction and becoming a 'nuclear power'. 
China was also involved in other conflicts in the decades that followed. The next conflict 
took place in Tibet during the 1950s, as China brutally 'reunified' it with the motherland. 
Other battles were fought over the reclamation of 'lost' territory, as was mentioned 
above: India in 1962 and the Sino-Soviet border in 1969. 142 Beij ing still regards these 
battles as domestic affairs of territorial integrity. The final war fought last century 
(although indirectly) was the Vietnam War of 1979; similar to the Korean War, it was 
fought under ideological slogans, pitted China against Western powers, and was 
proclaimed as a defensive war to safeguard China's national security. In short, Beijing 
asserts that these military actions were all in the name of protecting its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, promoting itself as a peaceful and benign power. Indeed, it appears to 
have refocused its current policies on maintaining a peaceful international environment. 
139 The role of the military will be assessed at greater length later in the paper. 
140 Han Sung-Joo (2000), pp.6-7 
141 Michael Yahuda (1999), p 650 
142 Varner (1999), p.2. Chinese rhetoric often refers to the 'humiliation' of the nineteenth and twentieth 











One aspect of China's 'new' approach to foreign policy has been the fIse and 
strengthening of its multilateral relations. Various global issues have emerged in the past 
decade that could only be solved via international cooperation, particularly on issues such 
as environment, aid, international crime, and nuclear proliferation. 143 China remains a 
great supporter of the United Nations, basing its 'five principles for peaceful coexistence' 
on the UN Charter. It believes that the UN helps to promote multipolarity whilst curbing 
the power of dominant states. Yet in 2000, Jiang Zemin stated that the UN was playing an 
increasingly important role in international affairs, and that, "To display its own role in 
the international arena, China will greatly rely on the UN. First, the veto right in the 
Security Council is one of the major fonns manifesting China's statt~s as a big nation. If 
the role of the UN is weakened, China's role as a big nation will also be reduced.,,144 
It appears that on the one hand China wishes to promote equality among countries, whilst 
on the other, it clearly wishes to manipulate multilateral organizations in an attempt to 
enhance its power. Sutter claims that China's growing adherence to multilateral 
organizations primarily stems from its desire to enhance its international image, and to 
influence the international arena. Some of the examples that he sites are Beijing's 
withdrawal of opposition to the non-proliferation treaty and its support for regional 
process such as ASEAN. 145 Whilst China has made progress in developing multilateral 
relations, Beijing clearly favours bilateral relations, both regionally and internationally. 146 
It is clear from Tables 3 and 4 that China holds a strong position on territorial integrity 
and non-intervention. Since the invasion of Chinese territory by Western Powers in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, protection of sovereignty has been at the forefront 
of its foreign policy. Since the fonnation of the PRC, a policy of 'national unification' 
has governed its political behaviour. 147 Under this strategy, China aims to reunify the 
143 Lee Nam-Ju (200 I), p.51 
144 Beijing Review, Li Bin, January 10th 2000 
145 Sutter (l995), pp.13-14 
146 Under Mao's leadership, China traditionally only pursued bilateral relations. Later generations of 
leaders have attempted to build up multilateral relations in response to the current political rules of the 
existing international order. However, bilateral relations still remain the traditional process of Chinese 
foreign policy. the extent of which will be examined in greater length later in the chapter. 











motherland, recovering the land ceded to Western powers through subversive treaties and 
the 'liberation' of Taiwan. To this effect, China 'reclaimed Tibet in the 1960s, fought a 
brief and bloody border war with India in 1969, and successfully saw the return of Hong 
Kong in 1997. Whilst China lays claims to a number of small pockets of territory, the 
major area of contention is Taiwan; Beijing determination to recoup Taiwan has 
significantly shaped its foreign policy. Although it believes that it is a domestic issue, 
China's policy of 'national unification' has profound ramifications. 
The second principle of foreign policy in Table 3 states that Beijing opposes hegemonies 
in safeguarding world peace. China views itself as a benign power, but intrinsically 
opposes the existence of hegemonic power, claiming that unchecked power undermines 
the stability of the international system. It puts forward the notion of equality among 
states, which a hegemonic system necessarily denies; this principle is born out of the 
Maoist ideal of equality and opposition to the bullying of weak states by more powerful 
ones. Beijing repeatedly claims that it will never behave as a hegemonic power. 148 
Indeed, China hopes that other powers, such as Japan, Russia, Europe, and even third 
world countries will rise to help curb the power of the present hegemony - the United 
States. 149 China's conceives of a 'new' multipolar world order in which many powers 
exist equally. To this effect, China has changed its foreign policy line to improve 
relations with the great regional and international powers, especially members of the 
United Nations Security Council, in order to promote multipolarity.lso Beijing's official 
line states that China actively follows policies that oppose a hegemonic global order, in 
favour of a system made up of numerous regional super-powers. 
Thus China's conception of how the international system should be ordered runs counter 
to U.S. hegemony, which it believes undermines the principles of 'Peaceful Coexistence'. 
It has actively sought to forge good relations with other Western powers in an attempt to 
counter U.S. supremacy. It generally perceives their actions as benign, inciting criticism 
148 Yahuda (1999), p.651, Lee Nam-Ju (2001), p.55 
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only when they actively support the actions of U.S. domination. 151 Thus its main 
international focus rests on the activities of the U.S. in the global arena. China's primary 
concern lies with the interventionist nature of U.S. foreign policy, claiming that it 
undennines the national sovereignty and interferes with other countries' internal affairs. 
Washington's assumed role of international policeman during the 1990s has manifested 
itself in various military offensives. Its policy of 'humanitarian intervention' began in 
1991 with the Iraq War, continuing on a smaller scale in North Africa in Somalia and 
Rwanda. 
But it was the NATO bombings of Kosovo that caused fear and mistrust in Chinese 
leaders. A year later, Jiang Zemin stated, "During their interference in Kosovo, Western 
countries headed by the U.S. advocated that 'human rights' should transcend 
sovcreignty.,,152 Chinese leaders believe that this constitutes an underlying threat to their 
own territorial integrity, aware of the animosity the U.S. harbours over perceived human 
rights abuses in China. To add anger to fear, during a NATO air strike in May 1999 U.S. 
planes accidentally dropped a bomb on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Three people 
were killed and twenty injured. 153 Many Chinese believed that this was a deliberate 
attack, and many took to the streets to protest. Y ong Deng claims some Chinese leaders 
believed that the attack was a punishment for Chinese opposition to the war, to 
destabilize and humiliate the Chinese, and even to probe Beijing's reaction and its 
domestic response. 154 Since then, Washington has taken military action in Afghanistan 
and Iraq under their doctrine of 'Global War' on Terror. Chinese leaders have publicly 
supported the U.S., but remain consistently uneasy about its intervention and pre-emptive 
strike policies. 
151 Due to the limitations of this paper, the focus of China's international relations focuses primarily on the 
U.S., or U.S. led coalitions such as NATO. Beijing's policy towards major European countries is aimed at 
fostering a peaceful pOlitical climate to enhance economic ties. As will be shown later in the chapter, 
China's foreign policies are focused mainly on regional countries, and its relationship with the U.S. 
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6.2 China and the Role of the U.S. in Northeast Asia 
Whilst China might oppose Washington's policy of humanitarian military intervention, 
and perceive an ulterior motive for increasing its global domination, the U.S. plays a key 
role in Asia. Strengthening China's relations remains a primary foreign policy goal; 
China considers threats from domestic and regional sources to be greater than those from 
the Western powers, or strategic competition. ISS Reciprocally, Washington has officially 
adopted a policy of 'engagement' with China and Northeast Asia since 1994, as a 
principle of their official national security strategy.156 But their relationship in Asia 
remains a tense one. The U.S. has a strong military and naval presence, with numerous 
military bases in the Northeast, and naval bases in areas such as Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. 157 
But China is very critical of U.S. military power, particularly in Northeast Asia, The 
U.S:s presence is generally welcome by China's neighbours, who believe that it has a 
stabilizing influence, and constitutes an effective strategic defence. Beijing has an 
alternative view, General Chi Haotian, the former Minister of Defence of the PRC, 
declared in a speech that he saw American military presence, and the network of alliances 
that it had built up, as an attempt to contain and weaken China. 158 Frustration has arisen 
from Washington's recent consolidation of its alliance with Japan and its military support 
of Taiwan, and the construction of a Northeast theatre missile defence, which China 
believes is directed against Chinese national securityl59. 
China has vehemently opposed the 1996 amendment of "The guidelines to U.S.-Japan 
Defence Cooperation".160 Leaders in Beijing are worried that the U.S. might be 
facilitating, rather than monitoring, Japanese remilitarization. Their worries are further 
increased by U.S. support for Taiwan, providing the island with arms, and protecting it 
against Chinese military aggression. Fears of a military coalition between the U.S. and 
JSS Lee Nam-Ju (2001), p.61 
156 Chang Kong-Ja (2000), p.9 
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Japan, in protecting Taiwan against China, are further fuelled by the development of a 
theatre missile defence system in Northeast Asia. Thus China is deeply suspicious of 
Washington's policy in this region, believing that their actions constitute a deliberate 
strategy of containment, and the creation of an anti-Chinese region. Either way, U.S. 
presence certainly frustrates China's regional designs and aspirations. 
Yet for all its criticisms and suspicions, China's foreign policy is designed to 
strengthening its ties with the U.S., fostering a good relationship that is essential for 
maintaining a peaceful international environment, thus ensuring its growth in strength. 
Beijing succumbs to the political pressure applied by Washington to adhere to 
international obligations such as: non-nuclear proliferation and development of Weapons 
of Mass Destmction, human rights issues, trade issues under the WTO, and so on. 161 
China has also moved towards cooperation on a range of regional issues; it was central to 
helping to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, and facilitates cooperative actions on 
issues such as international drug smuggling, crime, and environmental policies. 
6.3 China-Taiwan Relations 
American involvement in China's bilateral relations with Taiwan since the 1950's has 
created a political gridlock between the countries. As a result of the Korean War, the U.S. 
signed a security treaty with Taiwan, which had broken away from China after the 
Chinese Communist Party came into power; it has been fighting since for its 
independence. When the U.S. later allied with China during the Cold War, a strategic 
compromise was made, resulting in the Shanghai Communique in 1972. This asserted 
Washington's recognition of 'one China' - the Motherland and the island of Taiwan - but 
that any resolution between them must be peaceful. However Beijing still refuses to 
foreswear military coercion. 162 Beijing's threatening stance led to a second treaty 
between Taiwan and the U.S. in 1979, which states that the U.S. must supply Taiwan 
with arms in aiding its protection, and that any military action made against it by China 
would be of 'grave concern' to the U.S. 163 
161 Yahuda (1999), p.658. 












The volatility of the Taiwan question has resulted in some politically explosive events. 
On the 23rd March 1996, Taiwan held its first free and democratic elections. 1M Beijing, 
feeling enraged and undermined, carried out military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in the 
run up to the election. Taiwan was nervous that Beijing intended to invade its shores, so 
America sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into the region. Beijing threatened that it 
would destroy the carriers if they entered the Strait. Both Washington and Beijing 
withdrew their troops, and outright confrontation was avoided. 165 The democratic 
elections went ahead, and Taiwan has since grown in independence and cultural identity. 
In 1999, the democratic President Lee Teng-Hui described his country's relations with 
China as a 'special state-to-state' relationship. The Beijing government reacted with utter 
fury, accusing Tahvan of abandoning its 'One China' policy, and demanding a retraction 
of the statement - so far no retraction has taken place, and the President's 'accidental 
slip' has been written into the Taiwanese constitution. 166 
Taiwan presents a complex problem for China. Its bilateral relations with the country are 
aimed at the eventual reunification of this 'lost territory' with the Motherland, and this 
policy remains steadfast and unchanging. The U.S.'s involvement in their relationship has 
greatly undermined China's efforts in completing this policy; Washington has been clear 
that its forces will become involved if Beijing decides to use military force against the 
island. Yet even in April of this year, The Economist published the Pentagon's 
announcement that it was selling $1.8 billion-worth of early warning radar systems to 
Taiwan - just after Taiwan's independence supporting president Chen Shui-Bian won re-
election. 167 China's designs for the prodigal son's return are being consistently thwarted 
by U.S. counter-measures. Even so, former President Jiang Zemin stated in 2000, "If 
Taiwan blatantly declares independence, we'll definitely take military action. But this 
will worsen the situation in the Taiwan Strait and lead to the involvement of the United 
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States.,,168 It appears that China is willing and ready to flex its military muscle in the 
Taiwan Strait, but presently cannot afford the diplomatic chill that will ensue between 
China and the U.S. 
6.4 China-Japan Relations 
China's bilateral relations with Japan have also proved problematic. Beijing remams 
suspicious of this traditional enemy, not least because of its security alliance with the 
U.S., which China believes is a deliberate policy of containment. Japan is also presently 
the strongest power in Asia, and thus provokes sentiments of rivalry amongst Chinese 
leaders. An article in the Beijing Review states, "Japan will still choose to follow the 
United States in politics and security defence and contain China in secret.,,169 China still 
harbours resentment over the Japanese atrocities committed during World War Two, 
particularly because Japan still refuses to make an official apology to the country. During 
Japan's occupation of Nanjing, its troops went on a two-month killing spree, massacring 
an estimated 300,000 Chinese citizens. 170 In response, China has attempted to stir 
traditional fear in its regional neighbours against the fearsome power of Japan, in the 
hope of undennining its power within the region. 171 
Relations have become further strained by an ongoing territory dispute between the two 
states over the Diaoyu Islands. These lie 112 miles northeast of Taiwan, and are 
renowned as productive fisheries, but may also contain oil and gas reserves a potential 
area of important resources. 172 Yet while China remains hostile and suspicious of Japan's 
regional intentions, there is no imminent threat of military force, and the two states have 
forged strong, if frosty, ties; whilst they might be rivals, they share important economic 
connections. 
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6.5 China in the South China Sea 
Beijing has also claimed control over the Spratly Islands; this archipelago is positioned 
off the coast of Southern Vietnam in the South China Sea. Strategically positioned by 
major shipping lanes, it is also believed to be rich in oil and minerals. China's somewhat 
aggressive approach to the territory has been contested by Brunei, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, each of whom claims part of the Spratly Islands. 173 
China's growing assertiveness in the area is shown by its newly established structures on 
Mischief Reef, which has allowed it to establish a military presence in the major 
maritime area of South East Asia, less than two hundred miles from Philippines, in close 
proximity to the major artery of shipping through Asia up to Japan. 174 Beijing's strategy 
in this area has caused great conceIT! amongst countries in this area, particularly the 
Philippines. Yet Chinese leaders declare that they are merely following their policy of 
reclaiming 'lost' territory. It seems curious, then, that the nearest inhabited Chinese 
territOlY to Mischief Reef is Hainan Island, more than 1,000 miles to the north. 175 
6.6 China and the Korean Peninsular 
Sinct; the end of the Korean War, the peninsular has been divided into Communist North 
Korea, supported by China, and democratic South Korea in close alliance with the U.S. 
Until the end of the 1980s, these relationships remained exclusive; diplomatic activities 
since then have blurred the boundaries, as China recognized the importance of fostering 
relations with both the North and the South. Indeed, peace and prosperity on the Korean 
Peninsular is crucial to China's policy of economic and political security.176 Particularly 
since the Inter-Korean Summit was held in 2000, a dramatic shift in the relations between 
the two Koreas, and their bilateral relations with the U.S. and China respectively, has 
occurred and has alleviated military tension in Northeast Asia. 177 
China's bilateral relations with North Korea have traditionally been based on their shared 
political ideology. Beijing formally described their relationship as 'blood ties', but now 
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calls it a 'traditional friendly cooperation'. 178 The ties have been loosened mainly in 
response to international pressure, but also due to ideological differences that have 
sprung up between the two nations. In 1992, during a process of normalizing China's 
relations with the two Koreas, it announced that it would put national interests and 
security before ideological similarities. 179 But Beijing's relations with North Korea 
remain politically strategic; North Korea acts as a buffer state against possible invasion of 
Japan onto the mainland, and maintains a hostile stance to the U.S. 180 Furthermore, good 
relations are needed to appease North Korea's nuclear capabilities. 
Since Beijing commenced its policy of economic growth, it has moved towards forging 
an economic and political partnership with lucrative South Korea. In August 1992, South 
Korea and China established diplomatic relations and trade reformations, with a promise 
made by China to reduce its military assistance to North Korea. 181 It has since promoted 
its political bilateral ties with Seoul as a "cooperative partnership for the twenty-first 
century.,,182 The strength of their political relations is primarily founded on the 
profitability of close ties. 
China has implemented an official four-point policy in its approach to the Korean 
Peninsular. Firstly, it claims that it will not hold political or military meetings with North 
Korea. Secondly, it does not wish for ideological conflicts to escalate tensions between 
the North and the South. Thirdly, it declares support of the denuclearisation of the 
peninsular, opposing nuclear experiments and imports of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Lastly, it promotes dialogue between North and South towards reunification of the 
peninsular. China has played an important diplomatic role between the two countries, and 
has gained U.S. favour by taming North Korea's nuclear intentions, particularly in the 
recent nuclear crisis that evolved last year. 183 But in truth, a divided Korea is beneficial to 
China. In maintaining the status quo between the two states, China enjoys a lucrative 
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commercial exchange with South Korea whilst maintaining its political and military ties 
in the North. 184 
6.7 China and the Western borders 
China's policy of national security is primarily focused on its Eastern borders, the area 
which is perceived as representing the greatest potential threat. Thus its regional policy at 
the end of the 1990s was to secure its Western borders in order to facilitate its Eastern 
focus on Taiwan, the Korean Peninsular, Japan, and the South China sea. So Beijing 
forged Western border agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Myanmar, 
and most importantly, India and Russia. 185 It regards many of these countries as buffer 
states, protecting China's sovereignty, and has made efforts to stop major powers from 
stationing troops in them. 186 
China's bilateral relations with North Korea have created a political buffer zone in the 
Northeast. Likewise, it has maintained close relations with Myanmar (formally BUlma) in 
the Southeast, regardless of the international disapproval of this brutal Communist 
dictatorship. In some ways, Myanmar now serves as a client state to its big comrade, 
receiving financial and political support in return for strategic defence bases. China has 
set up a chain of naval bases in Myanmar, allowing it to project power into the Indian 
Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In return, Myanmar's army - the root of its political 
continuance - has tripled over the last ten years, armed and trained by Chinese 
generals. 187 
India has risen to become the major power in South Asia; with a population of over one 
billion people, its comes close to rivalling that of China, and its economic growth is 
consistently burgeoning. Bordering on China, their bilateral relations have enjoyed both 
highs and lows, yet it remains a relationship of central strategic importance. In 1957, their 
solidarity was made official when they devised and embraced their 'Five principles of 
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Peaceful Coexistence'; these close ties were severed in 1962, when the two countries 
were engaged in a bloody border war. 188 Relations remained chilled until the 1990s, when 
both sides sought to resume diplomatic ties. By 1998, India looked to China to help calm 
Indian/Pakistan relations; China had previously aided Pakistan against India, providing it 
with military equipment and nuclear arms. 189 But Pakistan's aggressive overtures of the 
past decade, and the movement of its Islamic militants into China's own Muslim 
dominated region of Xinjiang, has led to the moderation of Beijing's support. 190 
India and China have moved towards a 'political dialogue' in resolving their border 
dispute, but while no agreement has been reached, relations remain amicable. The areas 
of shared foreign policy has encouraged the strengthening of their ties: Both are wary of 
U.S. 'imperialism' and its consequent 'humanitarian' wars, citing a breach of UN 
security council mandates, particularly in the case of the recent Iraq war. Both are 
staunch supporters of non-intervention and sovereignty. India, too, is concerned by the 
U.S. 's anti-ballistic missile defence, and thus feels the need to strengthen political ties 
with other Asian powers, regardless of ongoing bilateral disagreements. 
6.8 China and Russia 
China's bilateral relations with Russia in the Northwest have proved equally complex 
over the past fifty years. Their ideological fall-out in the 1950s led to ensuing years of 
mutual suspicion, no doubt nurtured by the anti-Communist Washington government. 
Tensions escalated in 1969, when the two countries were engaged in a military battle 
along their mutual border. Yet since the end of the Cold War, the two countries have 
slowly drawn together, united by their common suspicion of U.S. hegemonic power. In 
response, Presidents Yeltsin and Zemin issued a joint statement in 1992. It declared that 
both states would oppose hegemonism, would support non-intervention in domestic 
affairs, would not execute a primary strike with nuclear weapons, and would increase 
their exchanges in the economic, scientific, and military spheres. 191 Relations were 
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further strengthened in April 1996, when Beijing declared that the two countries now 
enjoyed a "strategic cooperative partnership directed to the twenty-first century."I92 
This joint 'strategic' partnership, though ostensibly a friendship and not a coalition, has 
taken on a stronger persona since its original inception. The Kosovo bombings by NATO 
in 1999 drew both states closer together; they were anxious about the new interventionist 
humanitarian doctrines that could easily apply to Taiwan and Tibet, as well as Chechnya 
in Russia. It also served to demonstrate U.S. military supremacy, and its ability to bypass 
UN resolutions. It seems no coincidence, therefore, in October of that year China and 
Russia held joint naval exercises in the Pacific to test their ability to exchange data. 193 In 
2000, Presidents Zemin and Putin issued a joint official criticism of Washington's 
'coercive politics', restating their joint policies of multipolarization, opposition to 
hegemonism, support for the UN Charter, and the safeguarding of peace and stability in 
the international arena. 194 One can only predict that as Washington continues its military 
policy of intervention and pre-emptive strike, flexes its military muscles to the world, and 
bolsters its presence in Asia, China and Russia will continue to draw towards one 
another. This relationship does not yet constitute a formal coalition; but the military 
essence of its nature, particularly defined by its arms dealing and mutual opposition to the 
existing unipolar global order, betrays the latent potential of this 'partnership'. 
6.9 Analytical summary 
Since the reformation of China's economy, Beijing has changed tack in formulating its 
foreign policy. It has followed a distinct strategy of building new regional ties, 
strengthening old friendships, and appeasing traditional foes. It now enjoys a regional and 
intemational environment of unprecedented peace and stability. We would expect these 
conditions under the characteristics of Complex Interdependence. Collective security is 
achieved through multi-lateral organizations such as the ARF and the UN, and through 
extensive consolidation of regional ties; this approach has allowed China to safeguard its 
complex economic ties, both regionally and internationally. Whilst its policy is primarily 
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shaped by its international relations with the U.S., its strategy towards other Western 
powers is to maintain amicable ties to encourage FDI and trade relations. As we might 
expect under Complex Interdependence, China's regional (as oppose to international) 
relations primarily shape its foreign policy agenda. 
Since the formation of the PRC, it has been engaged in four military wars, but since the 
Vietnam War in 1979, and the subsequent rise of Deng's foreign policy, it has assumed a 
more diplomatic role. This is particularly evident in the Korean Peninsular where Beijing 
has been promoting dialogue between the North and South, and curbing the Nuclear 
Crisis issue. The Chinese international identity that has emerged is peaceful, cooperative 
on major issues Guch as environment and non-nuclear proliferation, and non-aggressive. 
These aspects of China's refocused foreign policy - its movement towards a peaceful 
environment, the reduction in the role of its military, the nurturing of regional relations 
and its role as a regional diplomat, and finally its participation in regional and 
international multilateral organizations - are descriptive of Complex Interdependence. 
Yet many of these aspects can be reinterpreted under the Realist paradigm. Beijing's 
movement towards greater regional and international security has provided the necessary 
environment for China to foster its trading relations and thus strengthen its national 
power. Its affiliation with multilateral organizations can also be construed as a policy to 
bolster its international standing. Membership to the UN Security Council identifies it as 
a great power, and the use of its permanent veto power (often on territorial issues) allows 
it to flex its muscles on the international stage. Its role in the regional ARF, although 
directed towards collective security, is also suspicious; Chinese representatives refuse to 
discuss issues in the South China Sea and have blocked Taiwan's independent 
involvement in the Forum. These organizations facilitate China's pursuit of its own 
national interests. Yet Beijing clearly favours bilateral relations; this undermines the 
assumption of Complex Interdependence that would expect complex multilateral 











The role of the military has been greatly reduced in order to create a more stable trading 
environment. Yet China's regional wars and its two indirect wars with the U.S. serve as a 
reminder that China is willing to use force if needs be. It claims to promote peace but has 
officially threatened to use force on Taiwan (thus indirectly involving the U.S.), while its 
aspirations in the South China Sea seem increasingly bellicose in trying to achieve 
control over a strategic area possibly rich in vital resources. Under conditions of Complex 
Interdependence, we would expect an absence in hierarchy among issues, but economic 
and security issues clearly dominate and shape China's foreign policy. 
China's official foreign policy clearly states that it opposes a hegemonic system, 
favouring instead a multipolar world led by a number of regional super-powers. Beijing 
has frequently voiced its concern with growing U.S. world dominance, reacting 
particularly sensitively to its interventionist wars; sovereignty and territorial integrity are 
sacrosanct in Chinese perception, and can not be overridden by international 
humanitarian concerns. The Realist concept of 'the state' still clearly persists in the minds 
of Chinese leaders, and remains elevated above any international concerns. 
China's bilateral relations with some of its neighbours, particularly Russia, officially 
oppose the present international system, but China still actively courts the U.S. Whilst it 
is vociferous in its criticism, Beijing has not actively balanced against Washington as one 
might expect under Realist conditions. But we might ascribe China's strategic building of 
new ties with regional neighbours to a policy of low-key balancing, including its gradual 
strengthening of national power. Y ong Deng claims that, "China has not yet engaged in 
vigorous and consistent balancing intended to dethrone the U.S. hegemonic power, 
thanks to the lack of strong allies, inadequate capacities, preoccupation with domestic 
improvement, and the immeasurable costs of a confrontation with the US."195 
The apparent lack of 'balancing' in China's foreign policy appears to be following 
Gilpin's cosubenefit principle. Sutter claims "Beijing has been widely seen by many of 
the experts consulted for this report and others as accommodating pragmatically to many 











international nonns not because such accommodation is seen as inherently in China's 
interest. Rather, Beijing is said to view each issue on a case-by-case basis, calculating the 
costs and benefits of adherence to international nonns in each case."I96 The costs that 
China would incur by actively and openly balancing against the U.S. would be enonnous. 
China has not yet accumulated enough national power to be able to follow such a policy. 
Beijing's system-maintaining behaviour can be attributed to the fact that it is presently 
more profitable to confonn to the existing system - to embark on an openly oppositional 
policy would constitute national suicide in the present international order. But it should 
not be overlooked that China has, along with many of its 'partners', heralded the vision 
of a new world order. U.S. support ensures China's continued growth, but simultaneously 
fmstrates and 'contains' its designs in Asia. Perhaps if China were to feel threatened by 
the U.S. and other Western powers in the future, maybe over its abuse of human rights or 
aggressive policy towards Taiwan, it might prompt Beijing to re-evaluate the costs and 
benefits of maintaining the status quo. 












7. CHINA'S MILITARY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE 
Both Realism and Complex Interdependence theory cite the role of the military as an 
essential component in determining foreign policy. Having reviewed China's 
international and regional relations, we now tum to a closer assessment of its military 
capabilities and strategy. This chapter will commence by briefly summarizing changes in 
military policy arising since the ascension of Deng in 1978, and how the impact of 
modem warfare has significantly shaped China's attitude to national defence and its 
contemporary military reforms. Thus, we will look at Beijing's current military strategy, 
and its regional and international focus. The next part will focus on China's People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) and its inherent characteristics. A closer assessment will be made 
of its various components: its ground forces, navy, air force, its spaee program, and its 
nuclear capabilities. The following section will review Beijing's involvement in arms 
selling and arms purchases, and the steady increase of Beijing's defence budget. Finally, 
we will deal with contemporary key developments in China's military and defence 
policy, and how these might progress during the next two decades. 
7.1 China's miiitary reforms under the CCP 
China's view of security policy has traditionally been defensive in nature, exemplified by 
its famous Great Wall. When Deng Xiaoping ascended to power in 1978, he outlined 
China's national security objectives as: "Sovereignty, defence of China, reunification of 
'lost' territOlY, and modernization.,,197 Whilst Mao emphasized strengthening the interior, 
Deng changed China's focus to its coastal regions and the outside world;198 just as he 
opened up and refonned its economy and inter-state relations, so China's military policy 
has become externalised. The Vietnam War in 1979 prompted the start of a 
modernization policy when Chinese leaders realised that a large, ill-equipped army was 
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no longer reliable in defending national security.199 Most of the PLA equipment was 
virtually obsolete, mainly consisting of 1950s Soviet arms. 
Beijing's policy of modernization was further boosted in the mid-1980s, when the 
probability of a 'hot' war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union lessened. China began a 
policy of 'active defence', focusing on possible periphery conflicts and developing its 
military modernization and strategy to deal with short-term local conflicts.200 Yet the last 
two decades have seen a distinctive change of tone. The Chinese Defence Minister, in 
1999, described China's objectives as "to consolidate national defence, resist foreign 
aggression, safeguard state sovereignty ... maritime rights and interests, and maintain 
national unity and security.,,201 'Maritime rights and interests' refers to China's more 
'active' than 'defensive' strategy in the South China Sea, and across the Taiwan Strait. 
7.2 Impact of Modern Warfare 
The rise of the United States as the dominant military power, and its subsequent surge of 
military engagements have greatly shaped China's military policy. The Gulf War in 1991 
had a profound effect on the Chinese psyche; they realised that they would have to set-up 
their program of modernization and make significant changes to the structure of the PLA. 
In 1994, the PLA chief of the General Staff, General Zhang Warrian stated, " ... Facing 
blatant interference by the American hegemonists ... we must reinforce the Armed Forces 
more intensively.,,202 They felt particularly vulnerable by the huge technological gap 
between their militaries. But they have also observed many ways in which to improve the 
PLA, and the importance of electronic warfare, coordinated joint operations, fast 
deployment and rapid response, and most significantly the superiority of machine power 
to manpower. Improvement of information technology (IT) has become a primary 
concern.203 Consequently, the Chinese have closely studied all of the recent wars (the 
Balkan War, the Afghan War and the Iraq War) to help improve their own strategies and 
aid their program of modernization. 
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7.3 China's Military Policy 
In September 2003, Beijing's foreign minister spokesman Kong Quan stated, "China's 
national defence policies and military deployments are aimed at safeguarding national 
security and territorial integrity .... We will keep on marching on the road to peace.,,204 
Yet assessing the true nature of Beijing's military policy is greatly hampered by the 
shroud of secrecy cloaking it. Even China's current official policy of 'active defence' is 
an ambiguous oxymoron. A U.S. report to Congress in 2003 claims, "China values 
military power to defend economic interests, secure territorial claims and build political 
influence commensurate with its status as a regional power with global aspirations.,,205 
Whether China's policy is defensive or tinged with assertion, what is certain is that it is 
following a prolonged and significant modernization program of its military capabilities. 
Some analysts believe that this modernization is simply an updating of largely obsolete 
equipment. Others assert that its efforts are mainly geared towards building its 
international prestige whilst assuring its citizens that it can protect them.206 But there are 
those who believe that China's military policy is shaped by its on-going dispute with 
Taiwan, and possible consequent conflict with the United States.207 The direction of its 
modernization has been to build up its national defence system to enable it to implement 
short duration, high intensity conflicts along its periphery.208 Furthermore, it IS 
researching into ways to impede possible U.S. intervention in the area, and how to 
successfully fight asymmetric conflicts.209 Wen-Wei Po, Beijing's current spokesman on 
Taiwan stated, "China has no desire to be engaged in direct conflict with America, but if 
foreign powers would interfere and support Taiwan independence, we can only resort to 
'1' I' ,,210 ml itary reso utlOn. 
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7.4 The People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
The People's Liberation Anny (PLA) was originally created with the fonnation of the 
PRC. Unlike the neutral capacity of Western militaries, it continues to have close 
political links with the Chinese Communist Party. The tenn PLA describes China's 
military in its entirety, although it is also used in reference to its ground forces, which 
was traditionally the major component of the military. It now encompasses the rapidly 
growing anns of the navy, the PLAN, and the air force, the PLAAF. Whilst the focus of 
the PLA has become increasingly externalised, it is still utilized in quelling domestic 
unrest, and reinforcing social and economic policies, remaining an organic part of the 
political system.211 Since the gradual 'privatisation' of the economic sector, it has become 
increasingly involved in the national economy. The encouragement of PLA commercial 
ventures was originally necessitated by the need to raise revenue to fund its 
modernization policy. By 1993, the PLA owned more than 10,000 production and 
industrial companies, and had developed more than 2,500 products for civilian use?12 
Indeed. the PLA plays a decisive domestic role, involving itself in politics and 
economics, as well as military operations. We can therefore assume that China's military 
policy has a distinctly political incline, and that top ranking officers must have economic 
interests to protect and pursue when fonnulating military strategies. 
7.5 PLA Ground Forces 
The PLA ground forces constitute one of the largest standing annies in the world. Its role 
is "to safeguard China's national strategic goals, and to preserve regime survival, ensure 
economic rise, to shape the international environment and defend national interests.,,2l3 
But the PLA ground forces still contain many inherent weaknesses in its capabilities to 
fulfil its role. It suffers from poor transport, ground force leadership, training in combined 
operations, and low morale with a third of soldiers leaving the anny each year. Most of 
its soldiers are peasants with poor education, lacking professional, experienced soldiers to 
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operate high tech equipment.214 But the government is aware of these shortcomings and 
has put forward a course of action to address them. 
Since the 1980s, the PLA has seen a massive reduction and reorganization of personnel. 
Since the mid 1990s the army has shrunk from about one hundred divisions to about 
forty, and has nearly completed its proposed reduction of half a million soldiers.215 
Whilst some might construe this as a diminished role of the PLA, it has allowed Chinese 
leaders to reduce the costs of a large standing army, improve professionalism, and free 
funds to better equip and train its soldiers. Furthermore, it has allowed military leaders to 
refocus on other components of the PLA, particularly the navy and air force. It is 
believed that during the next two decades, the ground forces will be further marginalized 
by mechanical infantry and army aviation.216 Thus, whilst the ground forces are being 
significantly reduced, the PLA as a whole is growing in strength. Further, the remaining 
soldiers are gradually becoming better equipped, more professional, and trained in 
modern warfare tactics, including improved reconnaissance and asymmetric strategies. 
7.6 The PLA Navy (PLAN) 
Chinese leaders have placed increasing emphasis on the Navy (PLAN), during its 
modernization and reformation program. Concern has arisen from regional security issues 
and territorial interests, most notably in the Strait of Taiwan and the South China Sea, 
and has prompted China to announce its new doctrine of 'active defence'. The PLAN was 
traditionally a stationary coastal defence, but under this military policy has experienced 
considerable restructuring. The end of the 1980s and 1990s saw an increasingly assertive 
navy operating at growing distances from the mainland. Table 5 below lists the major 
areas of ostensibly aggressive behaviour by the PLAN: 
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1994 China set up a radar base in the Spratly islands. 
1995 Naval forces occupied Mischief Reef, part of the area claimed by the Philippines. 
1996 Tested missiles in the of Taiwan 
1999 12 Chinese warships entered the Senkaku island area, claimed 




.1 China announced it possessed neutron bombs, functional against Taiwan and 
. American carrier battle groups 
Table 5. Areas afChinese Maritime Assertiveness. 
Chinese leaders have declared that they are moving towards building a 'blue water' navy, 
capable of covering greater distances for longer stretches of time, which will undoubtedly 
make it a regional maritime power.218 During its naval build-up, China has been 
acquiring an increasing number of submarines; in July of this year, U.S. intelligence 
discovered a new type of attack submarine, whilst China is also cU!Tently building two 
nuclear power submarines?19 PLAN presently has approximately 29,000 personnel, sixty 
destroyers and frigates, about tifty diesel and six. nuclear submarines, and forty 
amphibious landing ships.22o Of all PLA components, it has received the most attention, 
but still remains far behind the technological superiority of the U.S. Navy. Still, one 
cannot overlook the increasingly aggressive nature of China's naval policy and 
technological acquisitions. With the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and the 
lucrative appeal of the South China Seas, this does not seem so surprising. 
7.7 The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 
China's air force, the PLAAF, has traditionally been the weakest link of the PLA.221 It 
originally received less attention during the modernization process, but is gradually 
undergoing a transformation from a defensive force to one with a modem, offensive 
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strike capability.222 America's recent military operations, particularly the Iraq War, have 
highlighted the importance of the air force in executing a definitive outcome. In response, 
greater emphasis has been placed on the modernization of the PLAAF, focusing 
particularly on electronic warfare aircraft, and joint operations.z23 At present, its main 
strength is its size; it consists of 3,000 aircraft capable of combat, but remains well 
behind Western standards, and is only hoping to close the gap by 2015. 224 
7.8 China - A Nuclear Power 
Although the major components of the PLA have undergone significant modernization, it 
still lags far behind the military capabilities of Western powers. Yet its possession of 
nuclear arms ensures that it is still a major power to be reckoned with. Beijing has allayed 
international concern via its ostensible commitment to non-nuclear proliferation, and its 
diplomatic role in the North Korean nuclear program. To project further its image of a 
responsible nuclear power, China is presently negotiating its entrance into the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 225 These 
multilateral groups control the export of nuclear materials and technology, and will allow 
Beijing to assume a role in determining global nuclear matters. Yet at home, China 
continues to develop its nuclear weapons and increase its number of warheads, twenty of 
which can reach the shores of the United States; by 2010 the number might increase to 
sixty.226 Perhaps they are mainly intended as a deterrent, but their growing existence and 
capability should not be overlooked. 
7.9 China in Space 
Historically, China has always been interested in scientific progress, and has rushed to 
acquire modem technology in updating the PLA, expanding its traditional frontiers to 
include a burgeoning space program. Chinese leaders have expressed a desire to become 
a 'space power', believing that it is an essential component in building national 
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strength,227 and in 2003 completed its first manned space mission.228 Whilst this was 
primarily aimed at increasing its national prestige, the program came under the strict 
control of the PLA. 229 The main areas of interest remain distinctly military in nature: 
reconnaissance, navigation, communications and small satellite technology.23o Perhaps 
under Beijing's current policy of formulating asymmetric warfare tactics, 'space' is 
considered an essential area of development a future frontier. 
7.10 Arms Sales and Purchases 
China has a long history of missile and arms sales to overseas countries. In the past this 
has caused great consternation among the Western powers, which have felt that these 
sales have contributed to political and military unrest. In the 1980s Beijing provided 
Pakistan with enriched uranium and bomb blueprints; it also had dealings with Libya, 
Iran and North Korea. 231 These actions greatly damaged China's relations with the West, 
and with the U.S. in particular, who believed that China was deliberately arming hostile 
countries. Beijing has since changed tack, limiting its arms sales to restore its relations 
with the West; Cbna has become less of an exporter and more of an importer, though 
,vhat tacit arms trading may be taking place cannot be ascertained. 
Whilst China's arms trading has slowed down, its arms purchasing has risen dramatically 
in response to its modernization program. According to a U.S congressional research 
service report, China's arms purchases reached S3.6 billion; this elevated it to the 
developing world's top arms' importer, only coming behind the U.S. and Russia?32 
Indeed Russia is the major source for its purchases, cemented by the 'strategic 
partnership' formulated in the 1990s. During each year of the 1990s, China purchased on 
average 51.2 billion worth of Russian weapons, and by 1999 this figure rose 
dramatically.233 The arms agreement is extensive, with Beijing purchasing advanced 
Russian systems for its military forces, weapons components for its own domestic 
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weapons production, and military technology for its modernization program. 234 China 
relies heavily on this trading relationship while it attempts to build up its own domestic 
weapons production facilities. Presently, it is incapable of building any advanced 
weapons systems, most prominently failing to design its own PLAAF aircraft.235 
China also has arms agreements with other countries, particularly the former states of 
Russia, and is presently working towards lifting the EU arms embargo,236 which was 
imposed after the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Removal of the embargo would 
herald a turning point in China's modernization program, providing greater access to 
areas of modem technology and weapon systems. China has followed a policy of creating 
and maintainir.g military relations with an increasing number of other cour.tries; by 2003, 
Beijing had established such relations with more than one hundred and forty countries?37 
This strategy is aimed primarily at fostering relations whereby China will be able to 
acquire modern military equipment and information technology. The test for the PLA 
will r~st with its ability to integrate this new technology with its present out-dated 
military apparatus. 
7.11 China's Defence Budget 
A primary indicator of the nature of China's national defence lies in its defence budget. 
The program of PLA modernization, undertaken since the 1980s, has been exceptionally 
costly and has led to an annual increase in the government' s defence budget. As Chinese 
leaders rely heavily on the consistent growth patterns of the economy to allow them to 
continue to up-grade and strengthen the military, assessing the defence budget should 
provides the basis for an analysis as to whether budget increases are merely reflective of 
economic growth, or whether Beijing is stepping up the pace of its military program 
beyond expected limits. 
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Yet the enduring problem of Beijing's lack of transparency means that the true figures are 
not publicly known. The government ostensibly addressed international complaints in 
2002, when it released a Defence White Paper declaring better transparency - yet it still 
reveals little of its real defence budget.238For example, the official defence budget in 
2003 was $25 billion, but when one includes off-budget funding for overseas weapon 
acquisitions is included, the figure increases to between $50 billion and $70 billion?39 
Table 6. below shows a comparison of the official Defence Budget and the Congressional 
estimated defence-related expenditures. It is instructive in a number of ways: Firstly, it 
clearly depicts the tremendous gap between what China says it is spending, and the 
amount believed to have been spent. Why the secrecy? One reason could be the Deng 
strategy of taoguang yanghui in which China should lie low "to conceal capacities.,,24o 
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But what Chinese leaders cannot hide, even in producing its official figures, is the sudden 
increase in its defence budget since 1999, most probably in reaction to the NATO 
bombings of Kosovo and the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. We have asserted that 
the Chinese economy is expanding on a fairly level trajectory, and has not experienced a 
relative rise in the past five years. And so it seems apparent that Beijing must be 
und~rtaking a more aggressive modernization strategy, stepping up its defence budget to 
accommodate this policy. Indeed, the Pentagon has claimed that Beijing might further 
double its defence budget this year.242 Thus, the figures represented in Table 6. suggest 
that Beijing may no longer be following a straightforward strategy of military 
modernization. Whilst we cannot ascertain that this policy constitutes an aggressive 
doctrine, there appears to be a clear acceleration of the PLA modernization program, 
essentially creating a military with greater offensive capabilities. 
It is currently held that China's increasingly fraught relations with Taiwan are the major 
motivator in this recent military step-up.243 Tensions have been rising since 2000, when 
the pro-independence Chen Shui-Bian was voted in as President of Taiwan. American 
intelligence asserts that China expanded its "aggressive military build-up" in 2003 aimed 
at winning a possible conflict with Taiwan, and adding seventy-five missiles annually to 
its deployment opposite the island.244 Further, China has shifted its strategic military base 
to its southeast coastal region across the straits from Taiwan.245 This is in response to 
Beijing's recent ultimatum to the renegade province: "Taiwan must re-enter the fold or 
face military action within the next twenty years.,,246 
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7.12 Key Contemporary Developments and Future Capabilities 
These new developments in the relationship between Beijing and Taipei represent a 
renewed level of regional instability; whilst China remains adamant that this conflict 
remains a domestic affair of national sovereignty, it cannot overlook the inevitable 
involvement of the U.S. if military action is taken. The possibility of such a scenario has 
prompted the PLA to develop equipment to discourage the U.S. from coming to the 
island's aid. Recent U.S. intelligence believes that they have developed weapons for use 
in asymmetric warfare - "assassin's mace" and "trump card" weapons - but what these 
actually consist of remains an unsettling mystery.247 A senior Pentagon official maintains 
that Beijing's near-term focus is centred on Taiwan, buts claims "there is something 
much broader and fundamental going on here. ,,248 
Jiang Zemin, prevIOUS premIer and now the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission presiding over the PLA, urged it to "accelerate the pace of modernization" 
earlier this year.249 He went on to state, "It is a strategic decision of major importance to 
push the reform of the armed forces, a decision taken after an analysis of all aspects of 
the international strategic situation of China's security and with an eye to take up the new 
challenges of new accelerating military changes in the world. We must seize the hard-to-
get historical opportunities and bring the reform into depth with a sense of 
immediacy.,,25o The step-up of military modernization has become evident in a number of 
areas. A new emphasis has been placed on intelligence, reconnaissance, and electronic 
warfare;25I missile forces are rapidly increasing in numbers, alongside developing 
advanced information technology and long-range strike capabilities;252 tools for 
asymmetric warfare have risen in prominence;253 and the PLA is recruiting a new breed 
of professional personnel. But Beijing is under no illusion that the PLA still lags far 
behind the military capabilities of the U.S. and the West. At this point in time China is 
only playing catch-up, but it is closing the gap at an increasingly fast rate. 
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So what form will the PLA assume over the next decades? A senior pentagon official 
believes that China is pursuing a "comprehensive, well-planned, well-executed 
transformation of all sectors ... and could be a world class military force in the next ten to 
fifteen years.,,254 A Congress report states that Beijing is attempting to achieve this in the 
next five to ten years, estimating that its defence budget will rise to $250 billion by 
2025.255 Further, its provocative ultimatum to Taiwan appears to underscore a growing 
military confidence; pursuing this line will inevitably involve facing the military clout of 
the U.S. But Washington believes that "Beijing would measure its costs associated with a 
decision to use force on international image and prestige, expenditure of resources and 
material, and the overall impact on the economy.,,256 At present, military action against 
Taiwan would be political and economic suicide, but the ensuing decades might generate 
a more favourable set of conditions for pursuing reunification. 
7.13 Analytical summary 
Supporters of Complex Interdependence theory would claim that the modernization of 
the PLA is in response to the largely antiquated nature of China's military. Whilst it has 
experienced a great measure of success in achieving modernization, one might argue that 
this policy is aimed at eventually entering the modem world. Under this interpretation, 
the role of the military remains diminished in comparison with other areas, such as 
economic reform. Beijing has proclaimed that its military policy is predominantly 
defensive in nature, and has actively sought to strengthen collective security via its 
membership with organizations such as the ARF. Further, although it regards the U.S. as 
a potential adversary, Beijing employs diplomatic appeasement to ensure good relations. 
This strategy has essentially risen from the need to protect economic ties, and ensure a 
peaceful international environment for continued economic growth. Thus, it would 
appear that these aspects of China's national defence and military policy are indicative of 
Complex Interdependence. 
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But such an analysis omits many features of China's military policy, and many of the 
above assertions can be undermined. Firstly, the data explored would suggest that the 
modernization of the PLA goes beyond mere catch-up. The sudden escalation in the 
program, enhanced by the rapid increase of the defence budget and arms purchases, 
suggests that the role of the military has become elevated to a prominent position on 
Beijing's agenda. A reporter from the Beijing Review states, "After the Cold War, 
although economic factors have come to the forth and issues of economic security have 
become prominent, military security in international politics and national security have 
not become less important.,,257 Indeed, they have come increasingly to the fore as 
tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait. One might even suggest that one reason for the 
perpetual push for economic growth is part of a strategy to boost the PLA; either way, it 
has still had that effect. 
Beijing has pursued a limited policy of collective security, but this has been mainly 
restricted to its Western boundaries, within organizations that it can overrule. China's 
assertive maritime behaviour in the South China Sea has caused great concern for other 
regional neighbours in the East, particularly Japan and the Philippines. But the most 
prominent area of regional aggression lies in China's bellicose approach to the 
reunification of Taiwan. Whilst Beijing might regard this as a domestic affair, Chinese 
leaders are all too aware of possible U.S. involvement, but refuse to back down. Under 
Complex Interdependence, we would not expect such measures of regional aggression, 
espeeially against countries with which China has strong economic ties. 
Beijing's political agenda presents a clear hierarchy of issues, which is topped by 
economic and military concerns, as we would expect under conditions of realism. Indeed, 
we have seen just how interconnected these spheres have become. The PLA is essentially 
political in nature, but is also deeply involved in China's private economy. We would 
consequently expect it to have ambitions to strengthen the position of the government, 
and pursue lucrative territory. To this end, the PLA have stepped up its policy of 
reunification, and expanded their vision to incorporate the South China Sea. This policy 











has two implications: firstly, the PLA is becoming increasingly aggressive within the 
region, thus undermining its proclamation of a 'defensive' military; secondly, it appears 
to be actively pursuing territories that are rich in profitable resources, allowing it to 
extend its power far beyond its shores. 
This is exactly what we would expect under conditions of realism. National security 
remains a primary issue on its political agenda, emphasizing its state-centric perception. 
Its rapidly growing economy has funded the modernization of the PLA, running in 
parallel with an increasingly capable military, yet the defence budget is now out pacing 
economic growth. Beijing's rhetoric of 'defence' appears to be misleading in light of its 
aggressive maritime behaviour and policy towards Taiwan. In sum, it appears that China 
is making cost/benefit calculations in devising its military policy; as military 
modernization progresses, its strategy becomes more assertive, particularly towards 
profitable territory. Beijing still appeases the U.S. in the understanding that conflict 
would incur heavy costs. Perhaps its ultimatum to Taiwan, citing a twenty-year window, 













8. CHINA'S DOMESTIC POLICY AND INTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Both Complex Interdependence and Gilpin's Realism claim that the internal 
characteristics of a country are indicative in assessing its foreign policy. So this chapter 
will review the various elements of China's domestic policy and its inherent traits.258 The 
first section will commence by reviewing China's recent historical experience and how 
this has shaped its present domestic policy. The second section will consider the internal 
problem areas the government is facing and its ramifications. This will be followed by an 
examination of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), political liberalization and political 
control. The next section will appraise the impact of domestic policy on formulating 
foreign policy. The final section will consider the rhetoric of contemporary Chinese 
scholars in interpreting China's foreign policy. The chapter will then conclude with an 
analytical summary. 
8.1 Historical Experience 
The Chinese psyche was deeply affected by the Western invasions of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, giving rise to the myth of the "century of shame and 
humiliation. ,,259 They have been further weighed down by the myth of the' golden age' of 
the past, believing that they have failed to uphold the prestige and dignity of their 
forefathers?60 China was further scarred by the bloody civil war that they endured during 
the 1940s, and the subsequent disunity of the nation. These factors have significantly 
shaped the central tenets of China's present domestic policy. Believing itself a victim of 
the West, it has pursued relentlessly its policy of reunification of 'lost' sovereign 
territory, and has cultivated a tradition of xenophobia, suspicious of anything foreign. It 
has also motivated Chinese leaders to pursue its former power status, intent on invoking 
international respect. But the primary consequence has been Beijing's focus on 
258 Analysing China's internal characteristics represents an area of infinite variables. I have attempted to 
consider only the major factors, hoping to avoid the minutiae that could result in an ambiguous assessment. 












maintaining social stability; its leaders believe China can only achieve greatness if its 
country is unified and its people content. 
8.2 Focus Areas of China's Domestic Policy 
Consequently, China's domestic policy is centred on domestic stability and national 
unity. Beijing has followed a distinct strategy of developing 'comprehensive national 
power', which was first developed by Deng in the early 1980s.261 Its primary resource for 
pursuing this policy is its economic development; this both strengthens the country's 
power base, and helps to improve the living standards of its population. Since Hu Jintao 
came into power in 2003, he has increasingly focused on domestic issues, following 
concerns of domestic instability, particularly the Taiwan issue.262 There is a prevailing 
belief that domestic instability invites foreign aggression; consequently, Chinese leaders 
believe that three essential conditions national unity, stability, and sovereignty - must 
prevail if China is to survive and develop as a nation.263 FUl1her, domestic policy is 
strongly coloured by the CCP's desire to stay in power, and its consequent need to justify 
its authoritarian role. 
8.3 Areas of Domestic Instability 
Chinese leaders face a myriad of problem areas that undermine their mam policy 
concerns cited above. The profound structural changes that China has endured over the 
past thirty years have had a considerable impact on the Chinese people and domestic 
stability. Economic reforms have created a rising middle class, but for the majority of the 
population it has removed the social security that they previously enjoyed. The 
reformation of SOEs has led to 4.2 million people becoming redundant, as well as 2.03 
million suffering from the closure of urban collectives.264 As the population explodes, it 
produces about twenty to twenty-three million more workers every year, creating further 
pressure on employment.265 So, whilst official statistics show an annual increase in 
employment, it fails to accommodate its burgeoning workforce. The creation of a private 
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sector, and the increase of foreign companies, has gone some way to creating more 
opportunities, but technological advances are mechanizing many previous sectors that 
were previously manual. 
Whilst urban unemployment is bad, rural unemployment is far worse; an estimated six 
million rural workers leave their homes to seek jobs illegally in urban areas.266 As the 
economic reforms focus on the profitable industrial sector, agricultural production is 
faltering and rural incomes are stagnating. These displaced workers, along with 
redundant members resulting from the PLA's reduction of half a million personnel, are 
increasing pressure on urban jobs.267 The government has expanded income support in an 
attempt to provide greater social security; In 2002 it doubled its expenditure on social 
security to 10.2 billion Yuan, but this still only covers about two thirds of those in 
need.268 Further, the 'illegal' immigration of rural workers to urban areas results In a 
forfeit of any social security, but many are too desperate to stay in their villages.269 
China's economic reforms have also created rising disparities in its social, economic, and 
political order. A widening gap exists between rural and urban areas. Unlike their city-
dwelling compatriots, rural peasants are greatly restricted in their movement. The 
government has slightly relaxed this 'Hukuo System', allowing them more freedom of 
movement within their provinces but not in urban areas, encouraging them to 'enter the 
factory but not the city'. 270 This has generally put the rural community at a distinct 
economic disadvantage, and has greatly limited their inclusion in the growing wealth of 
the nation. There is also rising inequality between provinces, particularly the rich coastal 
areas and the underdeveloped inland provinces, while Beijing's creation of 'special 
economic zones' also contributes to economic disparities. This is directly affecting 
domestic stability, as peasants clamour to receive the same opportunities as the rising 
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middle class. In 2000 petitions and collective actions by peasants made up more than half 
of all protests for the first time.271 
Rural/urban disparities are also apparent in China's ailing health system, but most 
impoverished Chinese have suffered a gradual loss of social security in this sector. 
During Mao Zedong' s rule, while many suffered at his hands, nine out of ten country 
people had access to subsidized clinics.272 But during Deng's march towards "happy 
capitalism' the subsidies began to dry up; presently in the countryside, 90% of the 
population have no health insurance, whilst the urban dwellers without cover is only 
slightly better at 60%.273 Under the traditional system, SOEs were expected to take care 
of their own workers, even running their own hospitals. But with the usurpation of most 
SOEs by private firms, workers have been left to fend for themselves.274 This has led to a 
growing disparity between the life expectancy of rich and poor provinces; areas such as 
Shanghai and surrounds show health indicators similar to most Western countries, while 
the poorer areas in Western China are at the bottom of the scale.275 Ironically, the SARS 
outbreak that occurred in 2003 has been hugely beneficial to the ailing health system. 
Chinese leaders have realised how acute the problems within the system are and have 
increased subsidies accordingly. They have also become gradually more aware of their 
growing AIDS epidemic, which along with the SARS outbreak has turned international 
focus in on China's domestic health service. Perhaps in response to this, Wen liabao was 
pictured last year touching AIDS victims.276 
Noticeable tensions have emerged concerning political inequalities. Local governments 
have been demanding that the central government in Beijing divide its growing revenue 
equally between provinces, instead of concentrating it into the hands of a favoured 
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few.277 This has resulted in the unequal development of China's infrastructure, 
particularly transport, communications, technology, but most importantly income. The 
nepotistic nature of the government has nurtured an environment of pervading corruption. 
Officials are appointed positions according to their associations, whilst unconnected 
talented aspirants are held in check. Social hierarchy is further enforced by the belief that 
the dominant Han Race is inherently superior to the many other ethnic minorities that 
make up the Chinese people.278 These rising disparities must have a particular impact on 
a population that has been force-fed communist ideology for the past fifty years; whilst 
they might welcome the new opportunities that economic reform has provided, many 
must be dissatisfied that the carrot is dangling just outside their reach. A survey carried 
out in 2003 records that 42.6% of people questioned said that Chinese society was "very 
unfair", and another 37.7% described it as "not very fair",279 
Beijing's policy of economic reform is also contributing to its growmg geopolitical 
pressures, which threaten to undermine social stability. Its relentless drive towards 
industrialization. and its adoption of the role of 'the workshop of the world', has put 
critical pressure on the environment. Pollution levels are reaching dangerous levels, 
particularly in urban areas; industrial plants are sucking water-sources dry; industrial 
waste is polluting rivers and pumping carbon monoxide into the atmosphere.28o Whilst 
whole ecological systems are collapsing, extensive deforestation is further degrading the 
poor air quality and causing extensive soil erosion. Moreover, arable land is shrinking as 
fields make way for new industrial complexes?81 China's mushrooming popUlation is 
placing increasing pressure on the country's resources, which will only increase as the 
living standards of the people rise. Whilst these factors do not presently threaten to 
undermine social stability, there is no doubt that they will if not addressed quickly and 
efficiently by the government. 
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8.4 National Separatism 
China's domestic stability has felt the repercussions of its significant economic 
reformations and its inherent geopolitical pressure points, but these have only constituted 
a mild tremor. The government is aware of these destabilizing factors and has moved 
towards addressing these issues. Yet what Beijing fears most are renegade factions of 
Chinese society pushing for national separatism. China has historically faced the internal 
challenge of the huge number of ethnic minorities that make up the Chinese people. 
When Mao came into power in 1949, he identified fifty-five different ethnic groups, 
bringing them all together under a strong unifying program; whilst they were all 'equal' 
all were less equal than the superior Han Race.282 Yet they all existed under the common 
ideology of communism, which served to bind them together. This bond has begun to 
dissolve since the end of the Cold War; the collapse of Eastern European Communism 
was brought about in pa11 by rising national separatism. and calls for government 
deposal. The vibrations of tumbling communist states reached China, giving rise to 
. . f' I . 283 growmg sentIments 0 . natIona separatIsm. 
Taiwan is considered the primary area of national separatism, and consequently receives 
the mest attention, though this has been discussed at length earlier in the paper. Ethnic 
separatism in Tibet is another thorn in the CCP's side; though the country has been under 
Chinese control for fOlty years, calls for independence have grown in international 
prestige. The work of the Dalai Lama has ensured that not just powerful governments, but 
powerful individuals and celebrities support Tibet's national separatist protest. Beijing 
believes that this represents an acute threat to central contro1.284 The Beijing Review 
reports, "In this present decade, the struggle against separatism will ascend to a 
prominent place as a major issue concerning China's security.,,285 Beijing also faces the 
prospects of growing religious extremism, particularly in its Western provinces, and the 
threat of political dissidents, officially describing them in 2001 as "evil forces".286 
282 Lim Suk-Jun (2000), p.46 
283 Li Bin, Beijing Review, January 10th 2000, p.19 
284 Report to Congress (2004), p.l2 
285 Li Bin, Beijing Review, January 10th 2000, p.l9 











8.5 "New Nationalism" 
But Chinese leaders have created a very effective weapon to stamp out separatism -
Nationalism. Since the demise of Mao Zedong, following Chinese leaders have 
reconstructed their official discourse on nationalism; dubbed "New Nationalism", it calls 
for the re-centralization of China to become a strong, independent nation-state?87 Official 
promotion of nationalism has a dual intention. Firstly, it strengthens domestic socio-
political stability, undermines national separatism, and builds national pride and morale. 
Secondly, rising nationalism helps to strengthen the CCP's politicallegitimacy?88 
Chinese leaders have appealed directly to the people's sense of injured pride, 
proclaiming, "We were number one once, and we will be number one again.,,289 The 
restitution of Chinese dignity and the cultivation of national culture underline many areas 
of domestic policy. When Deng Xiaoping assumed power, he put forth the concept of 
"socialism with Chinese characteristics,,,29o and so promoted the idea that Chinese culture 
is fundamentally different from that of other states. Chinese leaders have also encouraged 
their people to be wary of outside influence, which has become increasingly pervasive 
through the portals of Taiwan and Hong Kong. In 1996, a best selling book was 
published called, "China can say no". It called on Chinese to embrace their own sense of 
identity, and to 'say no' to political, economic, and cultural influences from the U.S., 
Japan, and Europe, arguing that it hinders their emergence as a power.29J 
National pride has also been nurtured through mediums such as sport. As China grew in 
national strength during the 1980s and 1990s, it began to storm the Olympic games with 
its winning team known as 'MA's Army'. At the recent games at Athens, China proved a 
strong competitor against the U.S. and ranked among the top five countries in the world. 
The games have always served as a strong political barometer; the Cold War produced 
intense competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, increasing their prestige and 
evoking patriotism. Now international attention will focus on Beijing, as it prepares to 
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receive the world at the 2008 Olympic Games. As well as providing a great opportunity 
to boost its international status and boost its modernization, nationalism will be greatly 
enhanced. 
Yet the CCP's ulterior motive for encouraging nationalism is less utilitarian in spirit. The 
death of Mao Zedong has resulted in the gradual erosion of communist ideology. Post-
Mao leaders have been unable to rely on the enormous personal prestige or political 
philosophy to the same extent. Recognizing the inability of communist principles to 
support their continued domination of political power, Chinese leaders have had to play 
on nationalism to help legitimise their rule.292 Whilst still remaining fundamentally 
communist in name, Chinese leaders no longer have to rely totally on a political ideology 
that has caused other governments to fall. Further, it has allowed officials to defend 
themselves against outside criticisms, declaring to the people that such attacks are a direct 
assault on their national integrity, and so evoking nationalist sentiments.293 
8.6 Politica! Control and Political Liberalization 
Since 1978, China ha3 experienced significant structural changes to its economy, which 
has seen the evolution of an essentially capitalist market system in place of the traditional 
planned economy. But politically, China still operates under the monopoly of the Chinese 
Communist Party, and political liberalization has been somewhat limited. Its citizens still 
operate under the forceful eye of the People's armed police;294 movement is still greatly 
restricted; freedom of speech and the media is still tightly controlled; and any formal 
competing centres of power are still prohibited, particularly opposing political parties.295 
The tension between economic liberalization and central political control was highlighted 
by the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Students demonstrated against the CCP when 
the economy showed an inflation rate of 20% whilst the standard of living declined; they 
protested for free speech, free assembly, and popular sovereignty.296 Chinese leaders 
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reacted with brutal violence, serving a harsh reminder of the latent force and control of 
the CCP. 
The government has suffered at the hands of outside criticism, particularly from the U.S., 
focusing on the lack of democratic institutions and freedom, and most vociferously on 
human rights abuses. Beijing GOntinues to take a hard line against outside criticism, but is 
becoming increasingly aware that limited reform is essential to safeguard domestic and 
regime stability. In response to growing international and domestic pressure, Beijing 
released a White Paper in 2000 on human rights, but its interpretation of this issue is 
quite different from the West.297 It claims that China has regained many of its human 
lights, which were lost when the people were 'invaded and enslaved by various foreign 
powers'.298 It chooses to equate human rights with the standard of living; by this 
deduction, it claims that Chinese have experienced the 'achievement of the lofty ideal of 
human rights' through the government's domestic policies of modernization and 
elimination of poverty.299 Thus Chinese leaders have attempted to appease both 
international and domestic concerns, changing the interpretation of 'human rights' to suit 
its political needs, yet still continuing to infringe the international protocol. 
Since Tiananmen Square and the consequent domestic and international outrage, the CCP 
has had to make some limited political allowances. Modernization and economic reform 
have led to a growing experience of freedom; consequently, the government has felt 
under pressure from a society with growing expectations. Small concessions have been 
made, such as relaxing control over the media, allowing cultural pluralism, and 
permitting some voices of dissent.30o The CCP has also pursued two policies to appease 
the rising call for increased political liberalization. Firstly it has played on the Chinese 
wallet, bartering political freedom for economic freedom under the slogan, "You are free 
to get rich, but stay out of politics.,,301 Secondly, the government has opened up village 
elections to demonstrate its support of grass roots democracy. Under the Organic Law of 
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the Village Committee, secret ballots are held to elect members of the village 
commission.3D2 How 'democratic' these elections actually are is hard to determine, but 
they have little or no influence on central government, and have not been extended to 
urban areas. 
The CCP have managed ostensibly to liberalize its political doctrine whilst maintaining 
strong central control. It continues to monopolize the political arena, dealing brutally with 
any potential opposition, and has recently witnessed a smooth and peaceful transition of 
power. Whilst many observers believe that China will eventually become democratic as a 
result of economic liberalization, this has yet to be realized. 3D3 Indeed China's domestic 
policies are clearly rooted in the government's strong desire to remain in power and 
consolidate its political control. Economic liberalization has been its primary tool, 
appeasing its people by ensuring a general rise in the standard of living. Chinese leaders 
have systematically tried to address areas of social instability, citing national unity as its 
domestic maxim. 
8.7 Public Opinion 
The CCP appears to have a firm political grip on the nation, but popular domestic support 
is crucial to its survival. The 'Blue Book of Chinese Society', published in 2003, 
comprises of a comprehensive survey study and opinion pol1.304 Though it reveals 
concerns about social instability in areas of unemployment, healthcare, corruption, and 
dissatisfaction with the social order, the findings are generally hopefully. In table 7. 
below, I have incorporated the findings of two separate surveys, and compared the 
results. 
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Table 7. Public opinion of living standards in the past five years and the future. 305 
The first set of data records the findings of a survey, which posed the question: "How has 
your living standards changed over the past five years?" The second survey asked: "What 
is your degree of optimism regarding life in the future?,,306 When juxtaposed, these 
surveys are quite revealing about popular opinion. In answer to the first question, an 
overwhelming majority claimed that their lives had improved somewhat, with only a 
small percentage believing that it had declined. The general consensus for the future 
paints an optimistic picture. Whilst most are cautious in believing that their standard of 
living would increase greatly, an increased number believed that it would increase 
somewhat. Further, less believed that they would experience no change, and pessimism 
of what the future held dropped by more than half. We can assume then, based on these 
recent surveys, that China 's domestic stability is under no major threat in the near 
future. 307 
305 Data sourced from Zhou Jiang "Survey of residents' life quality in 2002", Fewsmith (2003), p.47 
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8.8 Effect of Domestic Policy on Foreign Policy 
China's domestic policy and foreign policy has become increasingly blurred since it 
moved out of isolation. Beijing's focus on national unity and territorial integrity has 
affected its response on various international issues, especially territorial disputes, human 
rights issues, and democracy. The government has shown that it puts domestic stability, 
national unity, and preservation of the regime above regional peace. 308 Because of 
China's historical experience, its strong pursuit of national unity underlies its belief that 
internal weakness invites external aggression, as the Chinese witnessed in KosovO.309 
Thus economic growth has become the central concern for the CCP. By raising the living 
standards of the people, the government hopes to consolidate its control and increase 
domestic stability, and so ensure the continued growth of national power. This policy has 
significantly shaped China's foreign affairs. It has forced it to gradually liberalize its 
economy, and integrate itself into the international political arena. Its increasing need for 
domestic support is mirrored in its desire for international prestige and acceptance. 
8.9 Perspective of Chinese Scholars 
In assessing China's internal characteristics, it is useful to assess the intellectual political 
rhetoric of Chinese scholars. Because they also suffer at the hands of CCP censorship, 
their work serves as a good indicator of official political thought. At an APEC conference 
in 1994, President Jiang Zemin stated, "Modem technology has narrowed the distance 
between regions. Many challenges facing mankind often transcend national borders. 
Many issues such as economic relations, trade exchanges, scientitic and technological 
development, environmental protection, population control, drug bans, crime prevention, 
and prevention of nuclear proliferation are of a global and interdependent nature, and all 
of them require cooperation.,,310 Spoken like a true liberal. But was Jiang just putting on a 
public face, and how far has the concept of Complex Interdependence permeated Chinese 
academia? 
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Y ong Deng claims "the dominant thinking is still Realist. .. many of those who gIVe 
attention to interdependence are concerned with how China can best seek interests while 
avoiding harm, without recognising any cost of interdependence that China should 
incur.,,311 Yet there is scant literature on interdependence among Chinese scholars. 
Indeed, the official parlance of the government clearly defines China as an autonomous 
state, operating in a hostile world. What does seem irregular is the Chinese liberal 
intellectual argument for a multi-polar world whilst upholding that pluralism in domestic 
politics will promote instability and disorder, and that a 'hegemonic' government, i.e. the 
CCP, is the best political system for China.312 And so it appears that Chinese liberal 
thought is limited by its pursuit of national interests and the continuance of the CCP. 
The Chinese scholar, Feng Tejum claims, "national interests are the most long-lasting, 
the most influential factor and the most basic motive of the state's foreign behaviour.,,313 
Another leading Chinese scholar, Wang Jisi, also states, "The Chinese see international 
exchanges more in terms of the motives of interest and gains-losses thereof.',314 These 
statements clearly belie an academic leaning towards fundamental Realist principles. 
Moreover, the official Chinese line incorporates economic and technological issues with 
other hierarchical issues, pragmatically calculating possible gains and losses in 
formulating policies, to ensure the ultimate pursuit of national interests. 
S.10 Analytical summary 
Complex Interdependence asserts that foreign policy is not determined solely by the 
government of a country, but is shaped by internal domestic pressures. China has 
certainly displayed an increasing focus on welfare issues, and its desire to improve the 
living standards of its people. To this effect it has set economic growth as a top priority 
on its domestic and international agenda. Public opinion has become increasingly 
important to the CCP, demonstrated by the opinion polls collected for the "Blue Book for 
Chinese Society" and the issuance of a White Paper of human rights. Whilst economic 
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issues continue to remain a central policy concern, other factors are appearing on the 
domestic agenda such as health and environmental concerns. Under conditions of 
Complex Interdependence, we would also expect to witness close links between domestic 
and foreign policy; among other areas, we have witnessed this in the formulation of 
China's economic policies. 
But some requirements of the theory are not met. The role of the military in domestic 
politics, as well as international politics, remains an essential component of the CCP, as 
witnessed in Tiananmen Square and the 'renegade province' of Taiwan. Further, China's 
domestic policies are not adhering to some of the tents of international law, like we 
would expect. This is predominantly demonstrated by the CCP's refusal to adhere to the 
international doctrine of human rights. Complex Interdependence also assumes the 
inevitable spread of democratic political institutions. Whilst China has witnessed very 
limited political liberalization, it remains a steadfast communist state with no intention of 
accepting democratization. 
A Realist interpretation of China's internal characteristics can further undermine 
assumptions of Complex Interdependence. The CCP has clearly reacted to an anxiety 
about its political legitimacy by formulating a policy that raises the living standards of the 
people. Various threats to domestic stability threaten the continuation of the CCP, yet the 
consolidation of their political regime is the central concern of Chinese leaders - the need 
to protect their interests. Thus, economic growth has become both a domestic and an 
international issue, but is also part of a larger strategy of building a comprehensive 
national power. This policy has two Realist aims: firstly, to ensure national security, and 
secondly to legitimise the CCP's continuing monopoly of political power. In achieving 
this, economic and military issues dominate the domestic and international political 
agendas, exhibiting a clear hierarchy of issues. 
The non-political domestic pressures that the government faces, such as the population 
boom, urban-migration, ecological concerns, international crime, and so on, have pushed 











seems patent that Chinese leaders are happy to use these institutions to safeguard China's 
national security and increase its benefits. 
The CCP continues to maintain a strong political control, only allowing ostensible 
political liberalization to promote system-maintaining behaviour. It actively encourages 
nationalism, clearly defining itself as a sovereign state, ensuring that a virulent sense of 
nationalism pervades all social and domestic norms. Like its foreign policy, its domestic 
policy is also state-centric. This statement is supported by the Chinese academic literature 
on international relations, which visibly presents a political perspective heavily coloured 
by Realist thought. 
Finally, the CCP's pnmary desire to continue its monopoly of political power 
significantly shapes its domestic and international policies. If it were to adopt liberal 
principles - encouraging foreign cultural influences, movement of people, the limitation 
of sovereignty, and the erosion of its nationalist sentiments - the CCP's very existence 
would be greatly undermined, and opposing political voices would inevitably surface. 
One could make the assumption, therefore, that in order for the government to maintain 












Since the ascension of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese foreif,111 policy has undergone 
significant changes; China's ensuing policy of economic liberalization and domestic 
modernization has opened it to the world, both economically and politically. Beijing has 
undertaken a distinct strategy of integration, but does this policy indicate China's long-
term desire for global integration into the existing political order as asserted by Complex 
Interdependence, or does it represent a Realist, tactical progression towards acquiring 
super-power status? During the course of the paper, four different indicators of Chinese 
foreign policy have been assessed and applied to the two theories in an attempt to answer 
this question. These findings must now be collated in order to determine the answer. 
Characteristics of Complex Interdependence have been observed in each chapter. These 
have been most evident in Beijing's policy of economic integration into the world 
economy and the gradual implementation of economic liberalization; China has built up 
complex economic ties, both regionally and internationally, most significantly forming 
the United States, regardless of its inherent suspicions towards the hegemon, which is 
descriptive of Keohane and Nye's principle of 'multiple channels'. This has created a 
stable international environment, ensuring the continuation of economic growth. 
Furthermore, the CCP has relinquished some of its political control over economic issues, 
and its involvement in multilateral economic organizations, particularly the WTO, has 
consequently resulted in its conformation to international norms, and system maintaining 
behaviour, signalling a gradual adherence to Keohane and Nye's 'international regimes'. 
China has also made distinct changes in the formation of its regional and international 
relations, adopting a posture characteristic of Complex Interdependence. It has sought to 
build up regional ties, appeasing traditional foes, such as Japan, and pursuing an official 
strategy of peace, cooperation and stability. Beijing has sought collective security via 
regional organizations like the ARF, and international organizations such as the UN. 











Korean Peninsular, ostensibly upholding regional stability and 'peaceful coexistence', 
thus supporting Keohane and Nye's assumptions regarding regional security. 
Characteristics of Complex Interdependence are also present in China's national defence 
policies. Its modernization of the PLA is in keeping with the upgrading of other areas of 
infrastructure such as transport and communications. It has also witnessed a vast 
reduction of manpower, which will eventually see a cut of half a million personnel. 
Beijing has created military ties with over one hundred and forty countries, many of 
which are regional, furthering the perception of collective security. Perhaps most 
significantly, though, China's foreign policy is shaped by its desire to nurture its 
relationship with the United States, regardless of its underlying suspicion towards the 
country. This is exactly what would be expected under conditions of Complex 
Interdependence: using complex economic and political ties, such as the mutually 
dependent Sino-U.S. relationship, to ensure peaceful relations, emphasising Keohane and 
Nye's assertion that mutual dependence ensures peaceful relations, based on protecting 
economic interests. 
China's domestic policy is partly shaped by its desire for beneficent public opinion, as 
upheld by Complex Interdependence theory. The CCP has followed an official strategy 
since the 1980s that aims to improve the living standards of the people; to this effect, it 
has concentrated on economic growth to raise its GDP and average annual mcome. 
Beijing has also involved itself in multilateral talks over domestic issues such as 
ecological concerns, international crime, health issues such as AIDS, and so on. Thus 
Beijing has experienced an increased merging of the domestic and international spheres, 
and linkage of domestic policies to international affairs. Finally, China has allowed 
limited political liberalization in response to its economic liberalization. Though it has far 
to go, the introduction of grass roots democratic institutions might suggest that 
democratisation is gradually taking place, again supporting Keohane and Nye's 
supposition that Complex Interdependence will inevitably result in economic and 
political liberalization, breaking down central political control, and eroding the 











Yet whilst China's foreign policy displays these characteristics of Complex 
Interdependence, they can be systematically undermined using Gilpin's Realist 
interpretation. Furthermore, they fail to take into account other aspects of China's foreign 
policy that are clearly Realist in nature. 
Since 1978, Beijing has sought to build China's comprehensive national power. The 
primary tool for achieving this has been through the accumulation of wealth. Thus, to 
achieve this China has had to reform its economic policy at the expense of its political 
ideology. Beijing's only option has been to integrate partially into the world economy, 
which it has done with spectacular results, and is fast becoming one of the great 
economies of the world. Its economic policies have created an environment to allure FDI, 
and yet it has retained economic control through the reformation of SOEs and certain 
protectionist measures. Whilst China has had to conform to various international norms 
through its participation in multilateral organizations, membership of forums such as the 
WTO has ensured its presence on the international stage, and has increased the t10w of 
money into the country. Further, they have allowed Beijing to assert internationally its 
own policies and pursue its own national interests. China's policy of accumulating 
foreign exchange currency and U.S. treasury bonds has a distinctly Mercantilist essence, 
again contributing to and strengthening its national power base. Finally, economic issues 
dominate China's political agenda, clearly demonstrating a hierarchy among issues 
undermining one of the principal characteristics of Complex Interdependence. And so, 
China's economic policy is evidently Realist in design: economic integration is limited as 
far as possible, whilst liberalization is a means to an end; China has no option but to play 
by the rules of the current international political order whilst it builds its national 
strength, using partial economic integration is a subtle and lucrative political manoeuvre, 
supporting Gilpin's theory of costlbenefit calculations. 
Beijing has generally displayed system maintaining behaviour in its approach to 
international and regional relations. Maintaining a peaceful environment is crucial in 











accounts for its movement towards collective security. This upholds Gilpin's theory that 
a state will not change the system while the expected costs of such an action outweigh the 
expected benefits. And yet its involvement in regional organizations reveals that Beijing 
is visibly pursuing its own interests, showing unwillingness to address issues it does not 
want to discuss, such as conflict in the South China Sea in the ARF. Its participation in 
international multilateral organizations is essentially in order to bolster China's 
international standing and prestige; its prized position on the UN Security Council 
provides Beijing with access to international political agenda setting, again permitting 
China to safeguard and pursue its national interests. And yet Beijing clearly prefers to 
foster bilateral relations over multilateral relations in forming its international 
relationships, undermining Keohane and Nye's principle of complex multilateral ties, 
reinforcing China's Realist state-centric perspective. 
By maintaining the present political system, Beijing is following a strategy that is the 
most cost effective and beneficial to the welfare of China, in accordance with Gilpin's 
principles, yet it has officially expressed that it favours a multipolar world in place of the 
present hegemonic system. Further, it has built up strong relations with countries 
traditionally hostile to the U.S., including Russia and North Korea. Beijing has also built 
up strategic 'friendships' with countries along its western borders, providing political 
support whilst it pursues its interests in the east. Thus China has only balanced against the 
U.S. in a hesitant and low-key manner. At this stage Beijing cannot afford to formulate 
blatantly aggressive policies, as the costs would surely outweigh the benefits, but it is 
gradually building up external ties that will eventually bolster a more contending stance. 
Among the hierarchy of issues, China's national defence continues to dominate its 
political agenda, alongside economic issues, thus exposing the Realist nature of Chinese 
foreign policy and undermining Keohane and Nye's principal stating that the military will 
playa minor role on the political agenda. Beijing's implementation of economic reform 
has paralleled its policy of military modernization; yet whilst it has drastically reduced 
the size of its standing army, it has greatly enhanced its capabilities through technology 











few years, noticeably outstripping economic growth statistics, which have remained fairly 
constant. Indeed, Beijing's 'active defence' policy has become significantly more 
aggressive, particularly in the offensive nature of recent weapons' purchases from Russia 
and its bellicose rhetoric towards Taiwan. This behaviour undermines China's liberal 
rhetoric of peaceful coexistence, revealing its true Realist nature. 
National security is the pnmary objective of Chinese military policy, and the PLA 
remains state-centric in vision. Its principal objective is the reunification of Chinese 
territory and the protection of its sovereignty - aspects that are evidently Realist in 
nature. Further, the PLA protects and pursues China's national interests, encouraged by 
its involvement in the national economy, and has shown assertiveness in the disputed but 
lucrative Spratly Islands; this supports Gilpin's theory that a state's foreign policy is 
determined by cost/benefit calculations, thus the possession of Taiwan and oil enriched 
territory in the Spratly Islands are worthy of the costs incurred in claiming them. In sum, 
the central role of the military and national security, and China's regionally aggressive 
posture, undermine the assumptions of Complex Interdependence, and support Gilpin's 
supposition that foreign policy is determined by costlbenefit calculations. 
Economic issues dominate China's domestic policy. By raising the standard of living, the 
CCP hopes to achieve a more comprehensive power base, and so become a more 
powerful state. But its major objective is to legitimize its monopoly of political power in 
the face of an eroding ideology. Political liberalization has been extremely limited, and 
the government appears to have been fairly successful at bartering economic power for 
political power. China is far from undergoing democratisation - national unity remains 
top of the agenda, and China has successfully used multilateral organizations to address 
non-political areas of domestic instability, such as environmental concerns. Nationalism 
heavily colours domestic political discourse, promoted by the CCP's overriding desire to 
retain power. To this effect, the government must essentially pursue a Realist policy; 
liberalization and complete integration would necessarily involve democratisation, 
whereas a strategy aimed at pursuing a super-power status would ensure the longevity of 











The principles of Gilpin's Realist theory are clearly more descriptive of China's foreign 
policy than Keohane and Nye's Complex Interdependence theory, revealing the 
limitation of China's economic and political ties, asserting a clear hierarchy of issues, and 
confirming the central role of the military. We can therefore assert that China is pursuing 
a tactical strategy to become a super-power. Having reached this conclusion, it is possible 
to make a tentative prediction as to the direction of China's foreign policy in the coming 
decades. But it must be pointed out that these are only assumptions based on the theory, 
and that unfortunately history cannot be written in advance. However, China has 
remained politically stable since 1978, and it does not appear that it will undergo any 
profound political changes in the near future. The recent peaceful transition of power has 
further consolidated the country's political structure. 
The new leadership has presented a blueprint for China's external strategy that continues 
its predecessors' policies of creating peaceful external ties while concentrating efforts on 
building a comprehensive national power. 315 According to Gilpin's Realist theory, a state 
will maintain the political order if the perceived costs outweigh the perceived benefits. At 
present, China must maintain the system, following a policy of limited integration and 
acceptance of political norms, if it is able to acquire the national power required to 
change it. Indeed, any aggressive behaviour would inevitably incur devastating costs. But 
Gilpin asserts, "As the power of the state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial 
control, its political influence, and its domination/control of the economy.,,316 We have 
already witnessed China pursuing this strategy. Analysts predict that by the middle of the 
century, China would have achieved it development objectives, and will maintain the 
largest economy in the world, coupled with a fully modernized military; at this point 
China may seek to change the international order if it is able to incur the costs of rising to 
super-power status. 
315 Yang Jiemian article 











Yet China's response to its increased power will, according to Gilpin, necessarily rest on 
the character of its society, and the relationship between public and private gain. We can 
therefore expect China to seize any opportunities firmly with both hands. It has long 
desired to regain its position as a leading world power, and rid itself of its victim 
complex. Further, the privatisation of its economy and economic involvement of 
powerful elites such as the PLA will greatly motivate its expansionist foreign policy. If 
the U.S. recognizes that Chinese growth is inevitable, then conflict may be avoided by 
U.S. acceptance of China as a super-power. Taiwan remains the area of greatest concern, 
and an issue that may result in military conflict between China and the U.S. if a 
diplomatic solution is not found. 
But this fragile set of predictions is based on a China that continues on the same policy 
path as set out by the present CCP, and begun by Deng Xiaoping. China's foreign policy 
has proved itself to be pragmatic in its calculations, yet it appears to have adhered to the 
long-telm strategy originally set out by Deng: "Keep cool headed to observe, be 
composed to make reactions, hide our capabilities and bide our time.,,317 
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